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Country Economics Department - is part of a larger effort in PRE to:  (i) review past efforts in institu-
tional development. (ii) deterrnine where these efforts have succeeded and where they have done poorlyv
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Public enterprises (PEs)  - state-owned or  both policy framework and institutional set-up.
state-controlled productive entities whose output  and restructuring of individual enterprises.
is sold mostly in the marketplace - earn an
average 10 percent of GDP in developing  *  Extend its analysis of PEs to the socialist
countries (17 percent in African countries, 12  economies, explore the relationship between
percent in Latin American countries, and 3  PEs and the private sector, and study how best
perr'ent in Asian countnies).  to phase and sequence PE reforms.
Many governments are reexamining the role  *  Refine PE reform components and tools,
of the state, so questions about whether to divest  especially in terms of the phasing and sequenc-
PEs or make them more efficient are likely to  ing of price liberalization and competition: the
intensify. The Bank will increasingly be called  budgetary impact of PEs (their costs versus thcir
upon for advice and financial support in manag-  revenues - and here  Galal discusses the "watcr-
ing the transition period.  Galal recommends that  bed effect." how holding down costs in one area
the Bank:  raises costs in another); and the valuation of PEs
for divestiture.
Maintain its focus on rationalizing the size
of PEs. by liquidating nonviable PEs and trans-  *  Leam more systematically from expenencc
fering their ownership or control to the private  by analyzing the outcomes of PE reforms: the
sector. if that wiUl  make them more efficient.  In  performance of divested PEs; the effects on cFli-
helping countries improve the efficiency of PEs  ciency of staff reductions; and the effectiveness
that remain public, the Bank should emphasize  of program contracts on enterprise efficiency.
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1.  Public Enterprises (PEs)  are productive entities which are owned
and/or controllei by the state and the bulk of whose output is sold in the
market place (Jones, 1975).  As a sector, PEs play a significant role in mixed
economies, averaging 10% of GDP in developing countries worldwide, with PEs in
African countries higher than the average (17%),  Asian countries at the lower
end of the scale (3%), and Latin American countries somewhere in between
(12%). (Swanson and Wolde-Semait, 1989). They dominate important sectors in
most countries (e.g. infrastructure,  heavy industries, etc). Furthermore, PEs
are major borrowers in domesric and international markets; they draw
extensively on government budgets, and often employ a large segment of the
labor force. Therefore, attempts to improve their performance are critical co
the macroeconomic performance of most countries.
2.  In recognition of the importance of PEs. and their generally
unsatisfactory past performance record, the World Bank has devoted attenJion
to assist its  borrower countries in their efforts to improve the operating and
allocative efficiency of PEs. To this end. progress has been made on two
fronts. First, the Bank.  has developed and disseminated a  sector-wide approach
to PE reform. In this approach, PEs are viewed, as the name implies, as
enterprises whose managers are supposed to respond to market signals, and as
public entities whose managers are supposed to respond to their governments as
the owner and regulator. Therefore, measures to increase the effective
functioning of markets have been treated as a necessary condition to irmprove
the  operating and allocative efficiency of  PEs. Reforming PEs' institutional
set-up, to supplement and compensate for deficiencies in ilarket  conditions and
to persuade managers to respond to correct market signals, has been treated,
together  with market-related reforms, as a sufficient condition without which
the desired supply response may not be forthcoming. More recently, divestiture
has increasingly been utilized as a tool of public policy to rationalize the
size of the sector in such a way as to maximize the benefits from government
intervention to correct for market failure, and to minimize the costs of such
intervention resulting from bureaucratic or organizational failure.  The
rehabilitation and restructuring of individual PEs have continued throughout
to constitute an integral part of the Bank's approach to PE reform.
3.  Second, the Bank has increasingly  provided financial support to
its member countries embarking on PE reform programs. Increasing Bank support
is evident from the growing number of adjustment lending operations focusing
exclusively on PE reform (often referred to as PELs), or operations in which
PE reform constitutes a major componert, i.e. structural adjustment loans
(SALs),  sectoral adjustment loans (SEtALs), or technical assistance loans
(TALs).  By June 1989, the total number of operations in which PE reform was a
major component was 147, of which 24 operations were approved by the Board in
the last year alone (July 88-June 89)
4.  Systematic empirical evidence regarding the impact of reforms on
the performance of PEs has been relatively scarce; in part because of the
short time horizon during which PE reforms have been attempted on a sectoralbasis (the 1980s). More recent.;  however, preliminary Bank analysis suggests
that the overall effect of  these reforms, where they have been implemented, is
moderatel:  '  posi:i'.'e.  First,  there are indications that the size of  the  ?E
sector has declined (or  has been curtaiLed),  for example, in the Philippines,
Mexico, Jamaica, Togo and Guinea, thus implying greater room for private
sector initiatives. Second, the profitability of PEs has improved in countries
such as Thailand and Turkev. 'n other countrias (e.g.  Mauritius, Niger, Mali)
PEs' consolidated losses, excluding subsidies and taxes, have declined.
Profitability improvements  and/or reduction in losses partially reflect output
price increases, but they also reflect better allocation and use of resources.
Third, available empirical evidence regarding the budgetary impact of ?Es
(wnich is broadly defined as the difference between the flowi  of funds from the
Treasury to PEs minus the flow of funds from PEs to the Treasury) suggests
that profitability improvements and/or reduction in losses have largely meant
less dependency on the government's budget for financing (e.g. Mauritius,
Thailand). PEs' budgetary burden worsened in other cases (e.g. Senegal,
Malawi). Where the effectiveness of reforms to reduce PEs' budgetary burden
has been limited, attempted measures have been inadequate and/or unaccompanied
by the liquidation of non-viable PEs, the divestiture of those better run by
the private sector, and the restructuring of viable PEs. Even in these cases,
however, it could be argued that the budgetary burden could have been worse in
the absence of reforms.
5.  Notwithstanding this progress, new challenges are emerging. At the
conceptual level, recent developments in socialist economies --in particular
as some of these economies are moving toward greater decentralization and
reliance on market forces-- suggest the need to extend the Bank's approach to
PE reform to socialist countries. The increasing emphasis on the private
sector as an important engine of growth--yet its dependency on PEs--suggests
that the analytical approach to PE reform should consider their crowding out
and crowding in effects on the private sector. Thirdly, to maximize the
effectiveness and sustainability of PE reform, attention should be given to
the question of phasing and sequencing of these reforms. At the operational
level, the feedback from experience suggests the need to sharpen the tools of
PE reform, refine its components, and systematically consolidate the process
of learning from experience. The most pressing issues in this regard concern:
the phasing of price reform and competition, the budgetary impact of PEs,
enterprise valuation for divestiture, outcomes of PE reforms, the efficiency
consequences of staff reduction, the effectiveness of performance contracts at
the micro level, and the ex-post performance of divested firms.
6.  The need to address these challenges is gaining urgency given that
many governments around the world are increasingly reexamining the role of the
state. As a result of this reexamination, it is expected that questions of
divesting PEs and attempts to improve the efficiency of those remaining in the
public domain are likely to intensify, rather than diminish, in the near
future. In the process, the Bank will increasingly  be called upon for advice
and support in managing the transition period. To meet the expected demand,
concerted effort is necessary. Within the Bank, this requires collaboration
between the Policy, Research & External Affairs (PRE) complex and the four
operational regions. PRE is well positioned to provide an inter-regional
perspective. Operations (i.e., the Technical and Country Departments of-3-
different regions) can provide regional patterns, country-specific
experiences, and operational direction for the needed research. In addition,
valuable insights  can be gained from the acalemi_ communit'y  and other
development institucions.
7.  The rest of this paper will: (1) briefly summarize the 3ark's
approach to and experience in reforming PEs; (2) identify  more concrecely some
of the challenges lying ahead; and (3)  suggest, on the basis of findings, an
agenda for future work on PE issues.  Before proceeding further, howerer, one
remark is order. This paper is written for the Bank's conference on
institutional development. Yet, it addresses PE reforms in general, of which
institutional reforms constitute but one component. The wider focus was
favored because it emphasizes that institutional reforms should  be treated a.
an integral component, but not a substitute for, policy reforms in PE reform
programs.
I.  THE WORLD BANK's APPRGACH TO PE REFORM
A.  Evolution
8.  The World Bank's approach to PE reform  has evolved over time.
Until the late seventies, in the context of its project work, the Bank focused
on the creation, strengthening, and re_tructuring of individual PEs. Since
then, the Bank has increasingly  moved toward a sector-wide approach to PE
reform. In part, the shift reflects the fact that PEs in diverse activities
(e.g. infrastructure, industry,  agriculture) share common problems, many of
which are the product of public ownership. To solve these problems, a common
framework is required. In part, the shift mirrors the Bank's increasing
emphasis on the role of the overall policy and "  titutional environments in
the adjustment process at the macro level.  When  .is emphasis is translated to
PEs, it implies that the root cause of their poor performance lies to a large
extent in their distorted and rigid incentive structure, inappropriate
institutional set-up, and over-extended role in economic activities.
9.  Increasing Bank emphasis on a sector-wide approach to PE reform
has  not  meant  that the rehabilitation, strengthening or rescructuring of
individual PEs is  no longer necessary  Rather, it has meant that restructuring
was to supplement the sector-wide approach, focusing in particular on PEs
whose performance is critical to the success or failure of other actors in the
economy. It  has also meant that greater emphasis is now placed on the
liquidation of non-viable PEs, the sale of those better run by the private
sector, and the rehabilitation of the others.
B.  Theoretical Foundation of ARproach
10.  The theoretical folndation for the Bank's sector-wide approach to
PE reform is succinctly summarized in the following quotation:
M  the efficiency of an enterprise - public or private - is highest
when the enterprise strives to maximize profits in a competitive-4-
market, under managers with the  .tonomy,  capacitv, and mocivation te
respond to competition, and when enterprises that cannot compete go
bankrupc"  . (Shirley,  1989.)
Since PEs seldom face such conditions, largely for reasons of public
ownership, the Bank's approach to their reform is focused on assisting its
member countries in providing a more efficiency inducing set of condicions.
II.  The origin of this framework cannot be found in neo-classical
microeconomic theory, in which ownership is seldom discussed.1/ Rather, it
finds its ori.gin  in extensions to PEs of the arguments developed by property
rights, public choice and X-efficiency schools (e.g.  Alchian, 1965,
Williamson, 1975, Leibenstein, 1970). The basic argument of this literature,
which presumes extended or selective rationality instead of the presumed
rationality in the standard theory of the firm, can be stated as follows: In
large private corporations, ownership is divorced from management, thus a
wedge is creaced between the principals (the owners) and their agent  (the
managers).2/ Depending on the room for discretion, which increases in
sheltered (uncompetitive) markets, managers of these corporations are likely
to maximize objectives differing from, and often incompatible  with, profit
maximization. Monitoring managers and replacing them is costly. Therefore, the
principals are often ready to accommodate a tolerable level of managerial
discrecionary behavior, with adverse effects on efficiency. When managers, or
individuals within the firm, choose to devote less than maximum effort (for
reasons of inertia and limited incentives), X-efficiency theory argues that
the resulting output will be less tharn  optimal for a given input mix.
12.  In PZs, ownership is also divorced from management. Therefore, PE
managers could be expected to maximize objectives differing from profit
maximization, or to simply lead a tranquil life. And indeed several authors
have suggested alternative objective functions for PE managers (e.g. Niskanen,
1971, Aharoni, 1981, Baldwin, 1975, Galal, 1986, Levy, 1987).3/  Details aside,
the basic point of this literature is that PE managers are likely to deviate
from profit ma.cimization  to a greater extent than their private counterparts
for several reasons. First, from an ,nstitutional  point of view, politicians
1/ To be  sure, a  textbook theory of  the firm suggests  a role  for the
government to play in order to compensate for incidents of market failure (e.g.
exter,ialities,  public  good, increasing  returns,  asymmetrical information,  future
markets etc.). This theory leaves,  however, the form  of government intervention
open to include direct ownership of resources, regulation, and subsidy and tax
schemes.
2/  Extended rationality refers to situations in which managers maximize
ob,ectives other than profits, e.g. their utility. Selective rationality or X-
efficiency theory questions whether individuals maximize at all.
3/ Niskanen  suggests  that  PE managers maximize  their budgets;  Aharoni
suggests they  maximize their  autonomy; Baldwin,  Galal and Levy suggest that thev
maximize their utility with different arguments in their utility functions and
different political and bureaucratic constraints.-5-
tend to use PEs to achieve policical ends, e.g. appointing loyalists to
managerial positic-is  (a.g.  party members, generals). setting prices to satisfy
certain incerest groups (including  gaining votes for the party in power in a
aemocracy, Boneo, 1981), and using PEs for employment generation, or regional
development.'/  The mulciplicity of and conflict  between objectives often mean
che satisfactorv achievement of none; failure to achieve one objective is
often blamed on attempts to achieve the rest.5/  Even more, efficiencv losses
tend to persist, largely  because politicians are rarely voted out of office
for reasons of poorly performing PEs.
13.  Second, the problem of multiple objectives is exacerbated even
further by the problem of "plural  principals". The latter  problem refers to
the observation thae the ownership of PEs is either diffused or ill allocated.
Unlike private shareholders  who can trade their shares and claim dividends,
shareholders of PEs are not usually well specified. 6/ Hence, many government
agencies/ministries attempt to perform the ownership function. 
7/ They place
conflicting demands on PEs and interfere in their operations to the point
where they become an extended part of the government bureaucracy, rather than
commercial entities.
14.  Third,  one  consequence  of the  multiplicity  of obiectives  and
plurality of principals is that public agents tend to be unable, and at times
reluctant, to devise and implement efficient monitoring and incentive
mechanisms. The limitations of public agents to devise such mechanisms stem,
in addition, from their complicated hierarchical arrangements, information
asymmetry (whereby  managers are the ones who know the most about their PE5)
and the nature of managemenc within the civil service. In particular, civil
servants tend to be procedures rather than outcomes oriented,  -erventionist
(in the day-to-day operational decision-making of PEs), and to j.  ssess skills
less suited for promoting business-like behavior. The reluctance on the part
of bureaucrats to devise efficient monitoring and incentive systems is
believed  to arise in principle from their desire to maintain ambiguity so that
chey  can retain control, evade accountability and possiblv form coalitions
with PE managers to secure better pay, power and prestige.
15.  Fourth, from a market o^oint  of view, FE managers are likely to
deviate from profit maximization to a greater extent than their private
i4/  Boneo (1981) observed, for example, that upward price revisions of the
output of PEs in Argentina systematically followed elections.
5/  Jones (1985)  has shown, in Egypt  and elsewhere, that attempts to control
PE prices in order to benefit the poor turned out to benefit the rich.
6/ At one extreme, ownership is allocated to "society" (e.g. YugDslavia).
At best, it is allocated to a holding company (e.g. Italy).
7/  Typically, the Ministry of Finance attempts .o  maximize revenue form PE
operations; the  Ministry of Labor attempts to  maximize employment; the  Technical
Ministries attempt to increase their power and prestige through the expansion
of PEs under their domain.-6-
counterparts because PEs tend to operate, by and large, in sheltered markets
(which are either natural --decreasing cost industries-- or policy induced --
protection and the like). They usually escape the discipline of  financial
markets;  p.rticularlv  because  they  have  access  to  government  funds  and  credit
from  the  banking  svstem  and  abroad,  often  at preferential  termi.  Moreover,
they  operate  behir.d  barriers  to  exit;  that  is,  they  are  seldom  liquidated  even
when thev  prove  to  be costly  to  society.
16.  The implication  of this  literature  is  straightforward:  ownership
matters;  it  has consequences  for  enterprise  efficiency.  Public  ownership  and
management  of resources  of enterprises  producing  tradable  commodities  and
operating  in  relatively  competitive  or potentially  competitive  markets  entail
costs  associated  with  bureaucratic  failure  that  go largely  uncompensated  for
by any  gains  from  reductions  in  market  imperfections.  Therefore,  private
ownership  of such  activities  shoull  usually  be prcferred.  The same  conclusion
does  not strictly  apply,  however,  to non-competitive  firms,  i.e.  firms  which
may  be in  a position  to exercise  some  monopoly  power.  For this  subset  of PEs,
the  net  benefits  from  and feasibility  of regulating  private  monopolies  have to
be weighted  against  the  net  benefits  from  and  feasibility  of retaining  them  in
the  public  domain  and  reforming  thiem.  Assuming  that  a decision  is  made in
favor  of retaining  this  subset  of PEs  in the  public  domain,  this  literature
suggests,  in  order  to reduce  the  room  for  managerial  discretionary  behavior
and reduce  political  interference,  that:  PEs  should  pursue  commercial
objectives;  their  managers  should  be appropriately  selected  and induced  to
pursue  these  objectives;  and they  should  have the  autonomy  to  respond  to
market  signals,  in return  for  which  they  should  be held accountable  for
outcomes  and  rewarded  or penalized  accordingly.  PEs  should,  in addition,  face
greater  competitive  pressure  and  financial  discipline.  Non-viable  PEs  should
be closed  down. 8/
C.  Components  of AoDroach 9
17.  The  Bank's  sector-wide  approach  and  best  practice  solutions  to  PE
reform  correspond  to the  above  recommendations.  In its  endeavor  to assist  its
borrower countries to improve the efficiency of their PEs, the Bank suppor-s
reforms to: (1) rationalize the sector's size, (2) improve the PE market-
related environment, (3) streamline the institutional set-up governing the
8/  Theoretical  assertions apart, similar conclusions  are reached by  a
number  of country  studies  and  inter-country  comparisons.  One  such  study,  which
focuses  on the  determinants  of performance  of PEs in a sample  of .. 3 developed
and  developing  countries,  concluded  that  the  most  important  determinants  of  the
performance  of PEs were: competition,  managerial  and financial  autonomy,  and
accountability.  The  countries  covered  by the  study  are:  Austria,  Brazil,  France,
Ghana,  India,  Israel,  Italy,  Norway,  Pakistan,  Portugal,  Sweden,  Tunisia,  and
Zambia.  For  details,  see:  Ayub and  Hegstad,  1986.
9/  For a detailed  review of the Bank's  approach  to PE reform, reform
components,  best practice  solutions,  and  examples,  .ee  Shirley,  1989a.-7-
relationship of ?Es with their governments as the owner and regulator, and (4)
assist in the  rehabi:Lzatiun/'restructuring  programs of viable PEs. These
issues are brie!"I elaborated below.  °.
18.  Rationalizing The Sector's Size: Excessive gover-ment intervention
in the form of direct ownership of resources implies that the efficiency of
PEs will suffer for two  basic reasons. First, the government's scarce
administrative capacity will be spread too thinly across too many activities,
which, in turn, diminishes the government's capacity to perform its ownership
function efficiently. Second, PEs will exist in activities in which society is
likely to better-off, for reasons given below, if they are left to the private
sector (e.g. tradable commodities in general). /
19.  To rationalize the size of the sector, the Bank supports
divestiture (in the form of liquidation, sale of assets, contracting-out the
delivery of public services to the private sector or franchising) when such an
action is expected to promote efficiency.1 2/ Efficiency gains are expected
when divested firms operate, or are made to operate, in competitive or
contestable markets. The presumption is that the transfer of ownership will
enable private entrepreneurs to operate freely from problems inherent to PEs;
political interference,  multiplicity of and conflict between objectives,
plurality of principals, and rigid and inappropriate  control structures. The
new owners will, in addition, face the threat of merger and bankruptcy, and
will have to borrow on their own merit. In short, divestiture will internalize
the costs of and benefits from ownership. As a result, self-motivated private
entrepreneurs will exert greater effort to improve efficiency at the
enterprise level. In the case of divesting non-competitive PEs, the Bank
supports such an action when it is accompanied or preceded by the enactment of
an effective regulatcry system. Short of instituting such a system, it is
feared that private monopolists may exploit the consumers without necessarily
lo/ In  implementation,  it  is  possibLe  to  find  deviations  from  the
recommended approach. The implementation  experi.-n:e  is reviewed in section II
below.
l/ Activities in  which the  costs of bureaucratic failure are likely to be
large  have the  characteristics  of:  being small  relative  to the  product and factor
markets,  requiring  decentralization  of  establishments  and  decision-making,
involving the  production  of non-standardized  goods,  not requiring  lunpv  capital,
and being relatively labor-intenrive. For further details on these issues, see
Jones and Mason, 1982.
12/  Governments may  pursue divestiture  for  reasons  other than  or in addition
to  increasing efficiency; for example: capital market development, promoting
competition, resource mobilization, distribution of ownership, diffusing the
strength of trade unions and the like. These objectives are important in their
own right.  Yet, they  are  viewed  as  positive  byproducts from  divestiture  when they
occur.  Moreover,  it  should  be  emphasized  that  they  could,  perhaps  more
effectively, be  achieved via alternative  instruments; e.g.  financial sector
refornm,  deregulation, trade liberalization,  and subsidies and tax schemes.--
attaining anv gains in efficiency. 1 3/ But even then, the costs and feasibility
of instituting regulatory mechanisms have to be weighted against the ~:osts  and
feasibility of retanirng PEs in the public hard and rer;rming them.
20.  Increasinl Competition and Financial Discipl.ne: Even after
measures have been taken  to rationalize the size of the sector, the likelihood
is hLgh that some PEs (especiall';  natural monopolies producing non-tradable
commodities and possibly ochers) will remain public. As noted, the efficiency
of those is likely tc suffer when government policies diminish or preclude
competition in the product, input, factor or financial markets. Competition
reducing policies include: barriers to entry of  new firms ar,d  exit of
inefficient ones, widespread monopoly rights, excessive protection, price
control, uneconomic investment decisions, rigid !.abor  and wage policies, and
economically unjustified access to the banking sector, government funds and
foreign credit.
21.  To reduce the adverse effects of such policies  on the efficiency
of PEs, the Bank supports measures to promote competition and reduce the anti-
or-pro PE bias.  14/  To promote foreign competition, the Bank supports greater
openness to foreign trade (largely using instruments other than PE reform
programs) and export rivalry. Domestic competition is promoted by abandoning
monopoly rights, breaking-up large monopolies, facilitating entry of new firms
and liquidating PEs thet cannot survive on their own.15/  Measures to reduce
the bias against or in favor of PEs include the elimination of preferential
access to and terms of credit and foreign exchange. They also include measures
to reduce/eliminate PEs' access to government funds; i.e., operational
subsidies and the like. (The latter measure is motivated by efficiency as well
as fiscal considerations).
22.  In addition, the Bank supports 2rice liberalization, especially
for products produced in competitive markets, and price revision, on the basis
of long-run marginal costs, for non-tradable commodities that are produced in
non-competitive markets. Price reforms are intended to: correct for relative
price distortions, and allow managers the flexibility/autonomy to respond to
market signals; both of which should lead to better allocation and use of
resources. Cost-plus formulas are discouraged on the ground chat they promote
13/  Hemming and Mansour, 1988, Nellis and Kikeri, 1989, and Galal, 1989a
elaborate on the a priori conditions under which efficiency improvements are
expected from divestiture.
14/  Competition policies  may neither  be  feasible nor  desirable  where
economies of scale or scope are so large that only a monopolist could attain
them. In such cases, appropriate control mechanisms are especially recommended.
These recommendations are reviewed below under the heading "the institutional
set-up".
15/  For further details on competition policies, see: Frischtak et. al.,
1989.-9-
inefficient behavior at the enterpr_se level and impose a burden on the
consumers  and  os :ar  -uavers.
23.  As  marnv  ?Es  are  overstaffed  and face rigid labor and wale
policies, the Bank often supports staff reductions and changes in the rules of
hiring, firing and compensation. The objective of these reforms is to
encourage efficiency by ensuring an optimal mix of capital and labor, and a
stronger link between labor productivity and compensation. To alleviate the
adverse welfare effects resulting from lay-offs, the Bank supplements its
support to these changes by funding and assisting its borrower countries to
implement training, severance pavments, and redeployment programs.16/
24.  The Institutional Set-up: Increasing competition, reducing price
distortions, and eliminating the anti-or-pro PE bias will pave the way to
force PE managers to behave more efficiently. Without parallel reforms in the
institutional fr.mework to increase PE autonomy to respond to market
challenges and co hold mar.agers  accountable for outcomes, market-related
reforms may no. necessirily stimu.late  the appropriate supply response at the
enterprise level. PEs will not respond to increased ccmpetition aind  removal of
distortions with increases in efficiency if rhe Governn._ne-PE  inscitutional
relationship is one in  which PE managers are forced to: (1) pursue multiple
and conflicting cob,ecuives,  (2) respond to too many government agencies
(princi?als), (3) face ineffective  monitoring and reward systems, and (4)  have
limited managerial and financial autonomy in operational decisions of a sort
largely left to managers of private firms; e.g. pricing of products produced
in competi. se  markets, firing redundant workers and attracting and retaining
tnose with the appropriate skills, procurement and distribution, etc.
25.  The Bank, in addressing each of these issues in tl:rn,  supports
reforms to clarify enterprise objectives, better specify the role of the
government as che owner and regulator  change the control structure from ex-
ante to ex-post, hold managers accountable for outcomes and reward them on the
basis of achievements. Commercial PEs are encou-aged to pursue profit
maximization. Non-commercia'l  objectives should be pursued by other
instruments, such as direct taxes or subsidies. In cases where PEs are the
most effective vehicle to at:ain these objectives, the Bank supports their
quantification and explicit compensation to PEs. Concerning the role of the
government as the owner, it  has been suggested thac this role should be
limited to functions similar to those exercised by a head office in a
nultidivisional private firm.  17/  These functions are: setting enterprise
objectives, appoirting the managing director, evaluating performance,
rewarding or penalizing managers accordingly, approving investment decisions
when they require government funds, planning and coordinating across units and
activities, and -- most importantly--  doing nothing else. The role of the
government as a regulator should be assigned to a government agency different
16/ For  a  review  of  the  Bank's  experience  in  public  sector  pay  and
employment, see: Nunberg, 1988.
17/  The list  of government functions  as the  owner is  first  ccmpiled bv  Jones
and further elaborated upon by Galal, 1989b and Shirley, i989a.from that performing the owner:nip function; mixing the two risks producing a
conflict of interest.1'/  The regulatory function should be designed to
compensate :.r  nczAents of  market failure (e.g. provide irnformation,  regulate
monopo'y pric.ng,  support infant indvstries, etc.), supplement .ather .han
supplant markecs (e.g. collecuving  and disseminating information about markets,
technology, setting product specification for health and other similar public
concerns), and be ownership neutral (i.e.,  no distinction should be made
between public or private enterprises). Operational decisions should be left
to the managers of PEs.
26.  The above reforms often require searching for appropriate agencies
to perform the ownership and regulatory functions, modifying the laws and
procedures that are inconsistent  with recommended settings, phasing out some
superfluous or countLrprodu-tive supervisory institutions, strengthening
others, and/or creating new ones, training and technical advice. The
magnitude. scope and nature of the required changes in a given country depend
on the existing setting and how far it deviates from the desired arrangements.
Therefore, the details are often considered on a case-by-case basis. To ensure
the sustainability of attempted reforms, however, the Bank frequently supports
the implementation of mechanisms, such -s  program contracts or signalling
systems, the objective of which is to facilitate the process of holding
managers accountable for results and rewarding them accordingly.  19/
27.  PE Rehabilitation/Restructuring: Problems at the individual
enterprise level may still block efficiency improvements, thus rendering the
above reforms (policy and institutional) ineffective. For a given enterprise,
these problems could be tne result of, among other things: uneconomic
investment decisiors, technological bottlenecks, distorted financial
structures, poor management of inventorv,  weak marketing capabilities, and/or
lack of'  skilled and motivated workers and mana3ers. Of course some PEs  cannot
be helped; i.e., those that are neither able to cover their variable cost, nor
have the potential to do so. In such cases, the Bank supports their
liquidation. Other PEs legitimately need assisrance and can be turned around.
Here, the Bank, as noted, supports their rehabilitation and restructuring,
focusing on PEs whose performance is critical to the performance of other
actors in the economy. Regarding commercial PEs  that operate in competitive
18/  Assigning the  ownership and regulatory functions  to separate government
agencies has been suggested  in socialist economies, but  the same notion  is
equallv applicable in  mixed economies.
19/  "Program Contracts" and the "Signalling System" are conceptually the
same. Both are negotiated agreements specifying the government's obligations
toward the PE (e.g.  financial  obligations, pricing formulas)  and the  obligations
of the PE toward the government (e.g. performance targets). They are intended
to facilitate the process of evaluating PE  managers against agreed targets and
compensating those who show superior achievements. In implementation, the two
mav differ. This point is  discussed  below. For further  details regarding Program
Contracts,  see:  Nellis,  1989. For  further details regarding  the  Signalling
Svstem, see: Jones, 1981 and Shirley, 1989b.-11-
markets, the Bank supports the transfer of their ownership to  the p.ivate
sector.
II. REFORM EXPERIENCE
A.  Documentation of Reform
28.  On the basis of the PE  sector-wide approach, the Bank had, by June
1989, approved 147 projects in support of PE  reform, of which 24 operations
were approved during the last year alone (July 88-June 89). (See Table 1).
Most of these reforms were associated with structural adjustment loans (67
projects), followed by technical assistance loans (34  projects), and sectoral
adjustment loans (33 projects). In addition, 13 loans focus exclusively on PE
reform (PELs)  .20/
29.  Bank support for PE reform has been concentrated in Africa, which
alone accounted for 54 % of the total number of PE lending operations,
followed  by the Latin American and Caribbean region (LAC), the Europe, Middle
East and North African region (EME.NA)  and, finally, the Asian region. The
widespread and apparent incidence  of market and bureaucratic failures in
African countries in comparison with others, and the excessive size of the PE
sector in this region largely account for the concentrated effort.
Table l: Number of PE Reform Projects a/
Technical  Structural  PELs  b/  Sectoral  Total
Region  Assistance  Adjustment  Adjustment
..  ...............................................................
Africa  21  36  8  15  80
LAC  10  16  2  4  32
EMENA  3  8  2  11  24
Asia  0  7  i  3  11
Total  34  67  13  33  147
Notes: a. Approved as of June 1989,
b. Includes PE rationalization/rehabilitation loans, PE
institutional  development projects, and PE sector
adjustment loans.
Source: Statistical Annex.
20/  Public  enterprise  loans (PELs)  include  PE  rationalization/rehabilitation
loans (PERLs), PE institutional  development projects, and PE sector adjustment
loans.-12-
30.  The principal components of Bank-supported PE reforms and their
distribution bv countrv and lending instrument are given in the attached
statistical annex. On the basis of available information, some general
observations can be made: First, the components of reform correspond to the
Bank's sector-wide approach to FE reform.  Most operations deal with: the
sector's size (through liquidation and divestiture), the policy environment in
which ?Es operate, their institutional set-up, and the liquidation, sale or
rehabilitation of individual ?Es. This observation reflects the extent of
dissemination and wide acceptability of the approach. Second, despite the
similarity in coverage of issues across operations, some variations in project
design can still be detected. To some extent, these variations appropriately
reflect country-specific circumstances. For example the magnitude of the
problem of the state/PE and the PE/PE cross-debts and the excessively
interventionist institutional set-up in the Moroccan case led to a focus on
these issues in the PEL operation. To some extent, however, some variacions in
diagnostic studies reflect government's reluctance to undertake some reforms
(e.g. divestiture in India). There are also examples of mistaken diagnosis,
such as the early phase of PE reform in Senegal, in which the TA project
focused too much on control mechanisms and less on divestiture and PE-policy
related issues.21/ Third, the bulk of attempted reforms concerns the
government/PE relationship. The emphasis on institutional reforms can be
explained in terms of: (a) the weak and often inappropriate institutional
arrangements governing the government/PE relationship in most countries, and
(b) the fact that the overall policy and market-related reforms are often
addressed by the Bank under other umbrellas (e.g. structural adjustment loans,
trade loans, export promotion loans, sectoral loans). Fourth, the Bank's
support for divestiture is extensive, the evidence of which is apparent from a
recent Bank trview pointing out that the Bank has supported divestiture in as
many as 35 countries through some 70 operations, by the end of June 1989.
(Kikeri, 1989).
B.  Reform Outcomes
31.  FE reforms should, first, lead to a reduction in the size of the
PE sector. Governments, as they adopted import substitution strategies in the
sixties and seventies, overextended their involvement in the direct ownership
and management of resources. 22/ Reforms should correct for this overextension.
Second, PE reforms should improve the operational efficiency of PEs. They
support a more competitive environment and more flexible institutional
arrangements, both of which should pressure PE managers to strive for improved
performance and enable them to do so. Finally, PE reforms should increase the
contribution of PEs to the goverament's budget because, as efficiency dnd
profitability improve, remitted dividends and taxes should go up, and their
dependency on the budget for subsidies and other transfers should decline. The
question is whether attempted reforms have led to these outcomes.
21/ For a detailed  assessment of  the early  phase of  the PE reform  in
Senegal, see: The Project Completion Report for PPTAl, 1985.
22/  Occasionally, with  the active support of the Bank.- 13-
32.  Thus far, svstematic empirical evidence regarding the impact of PE
reforms on outcomes has been relatively scarce, in part because of the short
time horizon during which PE reforms have been attempted on a sector-wide
basis (only in the 1980s). More recently,  however, some preliminary Bank
reports are beginning to address this question. The findings of these reports,
which are summarized below, have to be interpreted  with caution for two
reasons. First, it is difficult to isolate the effect of attempted PE reforms
from the effect of other factors (e.g. p^licy changes at the macro level,
external shocks and the state of economic activity). Second, it is also
difficult to establish the counter-factual story; what would have been the
case without attempted reforms?
33.  Bearing these caveats in mind, some tentative conclusions can be
drawn.23/  In short, PE reforms appear, where they have been implemented, to
have on the whole brought about positive improvements. Further details and
examples follow.
34.  The Size of the PE Sector: Attempts to reduce the size of the PE
sector have been made in the Philippines,  Jamaica, Mexico, Togo, Guinea, Mali,
Madagascar, Benin, and elsewhere. Most of these attempts have been made in
Africa. Available empirical evidence regarding the impact of these reforms on
the size of the PE sector in relation to GDP is inadequate to assert that PEs
now play a less significant role in the economic activity than in the past.  24/
The evidence seems, however, to point in this direction. For example, the
Philippines has sold almost 25% of the state's 1985 portfolio. Mexico, as of
March 1989, had sold 180 PEs, liquidated 260, merged 70, and transferred 25
PEs to local governments. Tunisia has sold some 25 holdings. Jamaica divested
J$500 million worth of assets. Togo and Guinea have sold, put under management
contracts or leased a significant portion of their industrial PEs. Guinea
closed some 70 PE units. Togo, Mali, Madagascar and Benin have each liquidated
12-15 firms (Kikeri, 1989).
35.  Against these accomplishments, the divestiture process has been
relatively slow in other countries. For instance, in Senegal, despite the
government's announced policy of 'withdrawal  of the state" in 1985, hardly any
PEs have in fact been sold as of early 1989. In Turkey, where a large and
costly preparation for divestiture has been undertaken, very modest actual
divestiture has taken place. Moreover, the process is likely to be slower and
more complex in the future. In the first  wave of divestiture, Governments
focused on the sale of profitable, small or medium-scale enterprises. In the
23/  Clearly, more systematic  empirical  evidence is  necessary  before passing
a sound judgment about the  effect of PE reforms.  The LAC region's on-going study
regarding the impact  of PE reforms in  Chile, Argentina and  Mexico is a  beginning
in this  direction.  Other regions  of the  Bank should initiate  a similar exercise.
24/ To  assert  that  the  size of  the PE  sector  in relation  to GDP has
declined, one would have to rely  not on the  number of divested firms,  but on the
sector's value-added  in relation to GDP, its share in total capital  stock,
investment, and/or employment.-14-
second phase, as larger PEs come up for sale, the process will be slowed ky
limitations imposed by domestic aggregate savings, sensitivity to foreign
buyers, labor redundancy and che weak administracive capacitv to regulate
private monopolies. In addition, greater restraint would be necessarv to avoid
the temptation of granting undesirable concessions (tax exemptions and the
like) to sweeten the deal.
36.  From the Bank's perspective, some preliminary conclusions are
emerging. First, divestiture is better viewed as an instrument of public
policy, which may or may not improve efficiency, depending on the conditions
of the sale, the market structure facing the enterprise in question, and
whether or not the transfer of ownership is accompanied by the creation of
effeccive regulatory mechanisms in the case of divesting non-competitive
firms. Holding the alternative view (i.e., that divestiture is  an end in and
of itself) risks portraying the Bank to be ideologically biased. Second, the
bulk of divestiture, as noted, has taken place in Africa. Paradoxically, the
conditions prevailing in most African countries appear to be less suited to
undertake effective divestiture programs; most notably, several of these
countries have relatively underdeveloped capital markets, limited competition
and scarce entrepreneurial talents. Therefore, further Bank support to
divestiture in these countries should emphasize liberalization of the economy
and financial sector reforms prior to the sale of assets to the private
sector. Third, divesting monopolistic firms is proving difficult because many
LDCs have weak regulatory capacity. Therefore, attention to building such
capacity should be emphasized in the future. But even then, given the less
than satisfactory performance of regulatory agencies in developed countries,
it would be important to weigh the costs of and benefits from divestiture-cum-
regulation versus those of maintaining PEs in the public hands and reforming
them. Fourth, the process of implementing divestiture programs is proving to
take longer than anticipated; time is required to prepare a strategy, select
candidate enterprises, evaluate their assets, select appropriate modality,
announce and screen applicatlons, and strike the deal. Therefore, it may be
necessary for the Bank to employ or devise a lending mechanism that spans over
a longer pericd of time than is, for example, permitted under SAL operations.
37.  Operational Efficiency: Available empirical evidence for a sample
of countries suggests frequent, but not universal, association between the
implementation of PE reforms and improvements in the sector's operational
efficiency. The evidence from Africa shows that the financial performance of
PEs has been improving over time. 25/ 'Out of a sample of 18 countries, 8 have
shown an improvement as early as 1985 (e.g.  Mauritius, Ghana, Niger), 8 are
showing mixed results, and two are showing a deterioration (e.g. Ivory Coast,
Senegal)'. (Swanson and Wolde-Semait, 1989). In Thailand, where direct lending
for PE reform did not take place but implemented reforms are consistent with
those recommended in Bank reports on Thai PEs, aggregate profits of the non-
25/  Financial  profitability  and  operational  efficiency  are  used
interchangeably  in the text. The two will diverge, however, when  changes in
profitability reflect, for example, greater subsidies or higher output prices.
Since  available data  do not allow  such  verification, the  conclusions  of this sub-
section have to be incerpreted  with caution.- 15-
financial PEs  went up from Bahe 11.1 billion in 1983 to Baht 19.4 billion in
1988. ('world  Bank Report No. 7787-TH, 1989). Bv contrast, net aggregate losses
(profits -losses)  of the non-financial PEs in Senegal (excL.uding  t:axes  and
subsidies) have increased from CFAF 12.3 billion in 1982 to CFAF 17.3 billion
in 1986. (World Bank Report No. 7774-SE,  May 1989).
38.  Changes in the operational efficiency of PEs are in part tne
product of implemented policy and institutional reforms. Regarding the
immediate PE-policy framework, price liberalization or increases  have taken
place in almost all PE reform programs, for example, in Turkey, Jamaica, Togo,
the Ivory Cost, Morocco and Niger. (See  Table 4 in the attached statistical
annex for details). Significant staff reductions have been implemented in
Ghana, Niger, Togo, Panama, Jamaica, the Ivory Coast, and elsewhere. Reforms
of investment and c:edit policies and procedures have been introduced, for
example, in Congo, Ghana, Jamaica, Mexico and the Philippines.
39.  Despite the desirability of these reforms, it is cause for concern
that price liberalization  has not always been introduced in tandem with or
prior to introducing measures to increase domestic ccmpetition. In the
majority of cases, attempts have been made, through trade liberalization, to
increase competition in the import and export markets. Yet, evidence is
lacking to support the notion that measures to increase domestic competition
in markets where PEs  operate (by  breaking-up large monopolies, facilitating
entry and exit of firms and the like) have been addressed systematically. (A
few exceptions can be noted. In Hungary, for example, price reforms,
bankruptcy laws, deregulation of entry, etc. have been dealt with.26/ In the
Niger SAL, tax exemptions for PEs have been abolished). Finally, it appears
that the generous severance pay arrangements in face of restrained government
budgets are causing difficulties in implementing  staff reduction plans, for
example  in  Ghana.  More  importantly, it is not clear how redundant workers have
been identified. Short of any rigorous documentation, it is feared that
enterprise efficiency may have suffered in case the remaining work force did
not possess the desired skill mix.
40.  Reforms on the institutional front figured prominently in almost
all FE reform programs, for example, in the Philippines, Mexico, Morocco,
Ghana, Togo, Niger and Ivory Coast, and elsewhere. Attempts have been made to
strengthen information gathering and auditing, create focal points for policv
formulation and supervision  of performance, alter the supervisory function to
become ex-post rather than ex-ante oriented, and to institute  performance
evaluation and incentive  mechanisms.
41.  These reforms seem  to have achieved most, but not all, of their
intended objectives. In Pakistan and South Korea, the implementation of a
signalling system appears to have had a positive impact  on the efficiency and
managerial motivation of PEs (Shirley, 1989b and 1989c, Song, 1988). In
Senegal, information gathering and auditing have been substantially improved.
In Morocco, the support given to the Directorate of PEs of the Ministry of
26/  For reasons discussed in section III, F4nkruptcy laws have not led to
noticeable actual exit of firms in  Hungarv.-16-
Finance (to supervise program contracts, draft divestiture legislation, advise
on policy formulation, coordinate training programs, build MIS, and clean-up
arrears) is showing positive results (Ne-lis, 1989).
42.  Against these achievements, some deficiencies remain. The
implementa.ion of program contracts in Senega..  has been hampered bv the fact
that the govwnment  did not fulfill its  financial obligations (Nellis. 1988).
The minimum content of an effective program contract has not always been
specified. 27/ In such cases, it is feared that the bargaining process may not
have always led to optimal contracts. The applicability of the signalling
system, especially in African countries, is limited because the system demands
detailed, audited and reliable information. Institutions which were supposed
to act as buffers between different government agencies and PEs proved in some
cases to be an aa'itional layer to the existing bureaucracy (e.g. the holding
companies in Egypt, and possibly in Pakistan). Finally, insticutional reforms
are proving to be both difficult and time-consuming, largely because they
involve altering behavior. (For example, introducing a performance evaluation
in Ghana and the Philippines is taking years, not months).
43.  Budzetarv ImRact: Attempts to reduce the budgetary burden of PEs
have been made in a wide range of countries (e.g. Thailand, Turkey, Mauritius,
Malawi, Congo, Senegal, Morocco, Mexico and elsewhere) by means of
reducing/eliminating operational subsidies, clearing cross-debts, and
commercializing PEs' access to credit from the banking sector. The evidence on
the budgetary impact of these reforms is inconclusive. On the one hand, the
non-financial PE sector in Thailand, for example, has remitted to the
government more than it has received during the period 1983-1988. In other
words, PEs remitted more dividends, income tax, and loan repayment '.o  the
Treasury than they received in the form of subsidies and loans. (World Bank
Report, op. cit.). In Mauritius, the PE budgetary impact improved between 1983
and 1985, net transfers from the treasury to PEs went down from Rs 290 million
in 1983 to 160 in 1985 (Swanson  and Wolde-Semait, 1989).28/
44.  These attempts have not been as effective in other countries. In
Malawi, for example, while the budgetary impact of PEs improved between 1980
and 1985, net budgetary transfers from the Treasury to PEs declined from K 75
million in 1980 to K 13 million in 1985, but worsened again in 1986 (up to K
112 million). The case of Senegal is most illumin&ting. In this country, the
non-financial PEs have increasingly relied on government financing for their
27/  One exception is  the  way Program Contracts  have  been specified in India,
where they  are  known as the  Memoranda of  Understanding. In  this  case,  appropriate
criteria, criteria value and compensation systems are all explicitly specified.
For further details, see: Trivedi, 1989.
28/  The fact that PEs in the countries referred to have remitted positive
returns  to  the Treasury  does  not necessarily  mean  that  these  returns were
equivalent to the foregone earning opportunities for the government elsewhere
in the economy. If that were to be true, further reforms  would be necessary.-17-
saving-investment gap. The net budgecary burden has gone up  from  FCFA 16.3
billion in 1981, to  FCFA 27.1 in  1986. (World  Bank Report No. 7774-SE,  1988).
Direct operational subsidLes (specifically that  portion coming  out  of  the
government budget and defined as the base for the subsidy reduction program
under SAL conditionality) have declined from FCFA 6.2 billion in 1985/86 to
FCFA 4,1  billion in  1988/89. At the same time, however, 10  major loss-making
PEs have received an increasing amounc of resources - in  the form of
overdrafts - from 10 money-making PEs.  (See  Graph 1). Since recipient PEs
were in no position to pay back these overdrafts, the government had to carry
the responsibility of settling them, In essence, therefore, the temporary
budgetarT9  relief, resulting from subsidy reductions, was offset by future
outlays. /
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29/  Th  e  Government  of  Senegal  decided,  in  the  context  of  the  current  SAL IV,
to cease all cross-subsidies among PEs in the future.45.  '.here  attempts  to  reduce the  PEs'  budgetary burden have been less
effective, the following factors seem to have contributed to the result.
First, subsici'v  reduczions have not been matched bv a program of restructuring
at the enterpri3e level. As a result, enterprise financial problems resurfaced
elsewhere in the economv: in the form of zubsidies from alternative sources
(e.g. Senega'), in the form of accumulated arrears (e.g.  Argentina), or in the
form of excessive  borrowing from the banking sector (e.g. Kenya). Second,
actempted reforms focused only on one component or the other of the flows of
funds from the Treasury to PEs, neglecting the fact that what matters, from a
fiscal point of view, is the net budgetary impact of PEs (i.e. total flow of
funds from PEs to the Treasury minus the total outflow of funds from the
Treasury to PEs). Finally, perhaps the most important elements of the
budgetary impact of PEs are implicit (exemptions and preferential treatments
of all kinds). But, the elimination of these distortions has proved to be mere
difficult.
C.  Prereguisites for and Constraints to Better Implementation
46.  Despite the positive effects of PE reforms in several countries,
some prerequisites/constraints appear to limit the effective implementation of
these reforms. Some of these constraints have been discussed above. Others of
a  more general nature are elaborated upon below.
47.  For PE reform programs to be effective, they require that the
macroeconomic framework be in order. In a highly distorted macroeconomic
environment (the symptoms of which include:  overvalued exchange rate, negative
real interest rate, excessive protection, and widespread price controls), PE
reforms (including  managerial autonomy).may encourage responses to the wrong
signals and lead to undesirable effects.30/
48.  PE reforms are politically sensitive. They entail the liquidation
of some PEs and the sale of assets to the private sector. They diminish or
eliminate the room for rent-seeking activities. They often involve staff
reductions and reallocation of power. And they frequently include price
increases and/or subsidy reductions. Therefore, they are resisLed by a variety
of different interest groups; e.g. workers, bureaucrats, some politicians and
even some in the private sector who stand to lose from zeforms (since they
would have to compete in open markets). An important prerequisite for the
effective implementation  of PE reforms, therefore, is a strong political will.
30/  The Bank has generally adhered to this premise. Most PE reforms have
been preceded by or  introduced in conjunction with  attempts on the part of
governments to set the macroeconomic framework in order. In cases where these
conditions were not met, the Bank has refrained from supporting PE reform on a
sectoral basis.  A  case  in point  is Egypt, where  an  industrial  sector loan
focusing on PE reform was kept on hold because the  Government was reluctant to
move satisfactorilv on the  macroeconomic fronc.  By  contrast, sound  macroeconomic
management  in Turkey and  the Philippines made  PE reform both  feasible and
desirable.-19-
49.  Assuming  a  solid  macroeconomic  framework  and  the political  will  to
introduce  PE  reform,  the  proper  design  of  PE  reform  programs  is  critical  for
these  reforms  co  produce  their  desired  effects.  As  noted,  observed  variatio.ns
in  project  design  are  at  times  justified  when  they  correspond  to  country-
specific  circumstances  (e.g.  the  more  recent  PE  reform  programs  in  the
Philippires  and  Mexico).  These  variations  are  inappropriate,  however,  when
they  are  the result  of  a  mistaken  diagnosis  (e.g.  the  early  phase  of  the PE
reform  in  Senegal).  (This  observation  raises  a  more  general  question  regarding
the  appropriate  phasing  and  sequencing  of  PE  reforms,  which  is  addressed  in
section  III  below).
50.  PE  reform  must  ultimately  stimulate  efficiency  (alse  why  do  ic?)
at  the enterprise  level.  Country  case  studies  suggest  that,  while  there  are
several  necessary  conditions  (i.e.  reforms  of  the  sector's  size,  its  policy
and  institutional  environment,  and  restructuring  of  individual  PEs),  no  one
condition  alone  is  sufficient  to  attain  the  desired  results.31/  Therefore,  the
noted  inadequate  attention  to  promote  domestic  competition  in  markets  where
PEs  operate  appears  to  be  one  area  deserving  greater  emphasis  in  2E  reform
programs.
III.  CHALLENGES  AHEAD
A.  Overviev
51.  To  sun  up  thus  far:  the  Bank  has  developed  a  -igorous  approach  to
PE  reform  which  is  well  founded  in  theory.  The outcome  of  attempted  reforms,
albeit  not  sufficiently  analyzed,  app  irs  to  be  positive  in  several  countries.
The  question  is:  what  next?
52.  As  many  governments  around  the  world  are  increasingly  reexamining
the role  of  the  state,  it  is  expected  that  the  Bank  will  correspondingly  be
called  upon  for  advice  on  managing  the  transition  period.  To  meet  the  expected
demand,  the  Bank  needs  to  extend  its  PE  analytical  approach  to  incorporate
emerging  challenges,  especially  in  Eastern  Europe,  further  refine  the
components  and  tools  of  the  approach,  and  to  consolidate  in  a  more  systematic
fashion  the  process  of  learning  from  experience.  This  section  elaborates  on
some  of  these  issues  under  three  headings:  (A)  conceptual  challenges,  (3)
reform  components  and  tools,  and  (C)  learning  from  experience.  The  objective
is  to propose  a  list  of  topics  for  further  i.vestigation.
B.  Conceptual  Challenges
53.  Conceptual  challenges  stem  primarily  from  observed  developments  in
socialist  economies,  and  the  increasing  emphasis  on  the  private  sector  as  an
31/ On  the  one  hand,  Egypt  tried  several  institutional  reforms  leaving  the
PE policy  framework  largely  unchanged.  The  PE performance  has  been  disappointing.
In  contrast,  Hungary  attenipted  several  policy  reforms  with  limited  institutional
reforms.  As  noted,  the  performance  of  the  industrial  sector  has  been  modest.-20-
importanc engine of growth. In addition, observed variations in PE project
design and their limited effecriveness in some cases call attention to  the
possibilitv that reform programs mav noc have been proper.v packaged.
Therefore, i_ is important zo address the question mf proper phasing and
sequencing of PE refurms more systematically. To meet these challenges,
further analvtical work seems warranted. The rest of this sub-section
elaborates on the nature of these challenges.
54.  Socialist Economies: In recent years, socialist economies have
undergone substantial reforms, the basic features of which are grear3r
decentralization and reliance on markec forces (e.g.  Hungary, China, Poland
and Yugoslavia). These reforms have noc yet produced much change in behavior.
The problem is illustrated by the following examples: bankruptcy laws have
been decreed to facilitate the exit of inefficient PEs, yet, hardly any PEs
have gone bankrupt. Financial sector reforms and attempts to harden the budget
constraint have been undertaken to increase the financial discipline of PE
managers. Yet, limitations on private ownership, inertia and government
commitment to social objectives have rendered these reforms largely
ineffective. Attempts have been made to equip FE managers with sufficient
autonomy in operational decision-making. Yet, many of them have continued to
seek approval from the center, in part so that they could blame poor
performance on decisions taken outside their domain. Attempts have been made
to differentiate wages on the basis of productivity. Yet, self-management
arrangements have diminished the effectiveness of these measures. Fear of
inflation and possible abuse at the enterprise level have, in addition, led
nome socialist governments to impose  wage ceilings. In short, while many
reforms have been attempted, an appropriate supply response at the enterprise
level has not been forthcoming.32/
55.  The approach to PE reform current in the Bank suggests that PEs in
socialist economies, just as PEs (or private sector firms) in mixed economies,
are likely to function more efficiently when they face competition in the
product, input, factor and financial markets, when their managers are held
accountable for quantified objecti<s,  when they have the capacity and
motivation to  behave efficiently, and when non-competitive enterprises go
bankrupt. Therefore, to stimulate the desired supply response at the
enterprise level in socialist economies, policy-makers in chese countries
should be encouraged to alter the conditions facing their PEs  to  coincide with
those recommended in mixed economies.
56.  While che approach devised for PEs in mixed economies
appropriately describes the alterations which PEs in socialist economies must
adopt to become efficient, the path socialist economies have to follow to
reach these conditions is likely to be different for several reasons. First, a
private sector hardly exists in socialist economies. Therefore, the question
of individual property rights has yet to  be defined. Second, these economies
lack well functioning capital markets. Therefore, financing divestiture
32/  In Hung:y  for example, despite the substantial reforms introduced in
the 1980s, the industrial sector grew at only 1.3% during the period 1980-86.
For details, see Nagaoka, 1989.-21-
programs is made even more difficult. Third, the magnitude of the transfer of
ownership is at a much larger scale than in mixed economies, thus posing
questions regarding che limitations imposed by aggregate sav.ngs. :ourth.
attampted reforms are obliged to pay attention to equirv conr;iderations,
perhaps to a larger extent than in  mixed economies. (After all, socialism has
been founded  on the basis of equity). Fifth, the transition from a command
economy to a market oriented economy is  unprecedented, which raises questions
regarding the appropriate phasing and sequencing of reform. Finally, the
widely applied self-and collective management arrangements in socialist
countries impinge on managerial behavior in a distinct fashion; their  reform
requires special attention. On most of these issues, the mixed economy
approach can provide guidance and techniques drawn from the experience of
mixed economies. But the applicability and relevance of these lessons and
techniques  have to be verified and modified to suit socialist councry
circumstances. (This subject is now being considered by PRE and the EMENA
region).
57.  Do Public Enterprises Create Barriers to or Provide Incentives for
Private Sector Development?  In the  past few years, increasing emphasis has
been placed on the role of the private sector as an important engine of growth
in developing countrie.,.  Yet, the Bank's approach has thus far insufficiently
stressed the fact that PEs, by their  mere existence, could constitute a
barrier to or a vehicle for private sector development.
58.  For example, PEs may act as a barrier to private sector entry,
even if such entry is not prohibited by regulation, if the output of PEs is
underpriced to the point where private enterprises could not be profitable.
Conversely, PEs may act as a vehicle for private sector entry, for example,
when PEs are the providers of infrastructure  and inputs of production to
private producers. A more subtle (and  not uncommon) scenario is one in which
the output of PEs is overpriced. In this case, even an inefficient  private
enterprise, producing in the same price-controlled markets, would still be
profitable.
59.  The story could be made more complex if one were to allow for
various oligopolistic behavioral models; e.g. cartel, price leader etc. The
main point, however, is that the approach to PE reform needs to be extended to
more systematically analyze this relationship,  and to identify  ways to reduce
the crowding out effect of PEs and to maximize their influence in  crowding in
efficient privace enterprises. (This issue is currently being addressed in the
context of the on-going initiative  on private sector development in the Bank)
60.  Phasing and Sequencing of ?E  Reform: Identifying the components of
PE reform is one thing. Packaging these components and selecting an
appropriate speed and intensity  of introducing them is another. The problem is
that, unlike trade reforms  where significant  knowledge on sequencing has been
accumulated, the issue of sequencing PE reforms remains largely un,addressed  in
a systematic fashion. Consequently, it is  plausible that some of the
variations in pro,ect design and their limited  success in improving the
efficiency of PEs could be atrributed, at least in some cases, to this vacuum.
Moreover, it  is feared that, in the absence of such knowledge, reforms could-22-
be easily reversed, and the elimination of one market distortion, leaving
others unchanged, mav lead to  inferior solutions.
61.  A  few examples will illustrate the point. Policy reforms (e.g.
prices, wages and incentives, investment, trade etc.) are important
ingredients  in  any  PE reform  program.  Yet, policy reforms will  not have their
full  impact  on the efficiency of PEs without simultaneously reforming their
institutional set-up, and vice versa. (The deterioration in the performance of
PEs in Senegal and the modest improvement in the performance of the industrial
sector in Hungary appear to be consistent with this view). While price
liberalization may be desirable in and of itself, such a measure, if not
accompanied or preceded by measures to increase comperition or regulation in
the case of privace monopolies, may indeed be counterproductive. Similarly,
managerial autonomy is an important  element if PE managers were to respond
effectively to market challenges. Yet, autonomy without accountability may be
a recipe for abuse. The examples are numerous. The point is the same.
62.  To avoid the likely adverse repercussions resulting from
improperly packaged PE reform, further work should focus on establishing the
logical interdependencies among FE reform components. The product of such an
exercise would be part of the answer to the question of how to phase and
sequence future PE reform.
C.  Reform Components and Tools
63.  The need to refine PE reform components and tools is not caused so
much by the lack of knowledge of what needs to be done, nor ignorance
concerning the principles underlying needed reforms. Rather, the challenges
are caused by the need to define better ways to implement kncwn principles and
techniques. Issues of this nature include: sequencing price liberalization and
measures to increase competition, effective measures to reduce the  budgetary
burden of PEs, and valuation of enterprises for divestiture. These issues are
elaborated upon below.
64.  Price Deregulation: The rationale for price deregulation is
relatively well known; (1)  market determined prices better reflect the
relative  scarcity  of  goods  and  services, (2) price decontrol is consistent
with the notion that FE managers should be given the autonomy to respond to
market signals, (3) price liberalization will improve the financial
profitability of PEs, as many of them are forced to sell below average costs,
(4)  higher profitability will, in turn, reduce PEs' dependency on the
government's budget, and (5) market determined prices, in contrast with cost-
plus  arrangements,  are  iikely  to  induce greater efficiency at the enterprise
level. Equally well known is the principle that price deregulation should be
accompanied or preceded by measures to ensure market competitiveness, or at a
minimum market contestability. What is iess known is how to move from the
state of controlled prices to a state of liberalized prices. Inappropriate
sequencing of price liberalization and competition may cause PEs, as much as
private enterprises, to exploit their monopoly power, with adverse
consequences on the consumers and inflation.  Therefore, it is important to
develop an operational approach specifying the details of price
liberalization-cum-increasing competition, and to demonstrate the approach'sapplicability. (A draft paper on this issue is currentlv being finalized in
the Sank).
65.  Reduci.ng  the Budgetarv Burden of PEs: "The  'w'arer:-bed  Effect": As
noted, numerous attempts have been made in Bank supported programs r^ reduce
the budgetary burden of PEs. This objective has been pursued by reducing
explicit operational subsidies to PEs and in many instances  bv scaling down
investment funds.
66.  In implementation, two problems have emerged. First, while
subsidy r-eductions  have been adhered to, PEs have generally found a'.ternative
sources to finance their deficits, e.g. the banking sector, customers and
clients, foreign borrowing, or cross subsidization. (This is the so-called
water-bed effect, holding down one area causes expansion in another). The
second problem concerns investment cuts. These cuts, while arguably necessary
on fiscal grounds, have tended,  when they were applied to marginally
productive ptoject, to have adverse repercussions on the ability of the
economy to grow in the medium-term.
67,  To minimize the possibility of transferring the financial problems
of PEs from one actor to another in the economy and to reduce the cost of the
trade-off  between fiscal balance and medium-term growth objectives, it is
therefore important to: (1) investigate, initially on the basis of multiple
case studies, the extent to which the water bed problem exists, and whether
the trade-ofi involved is significant, and (b) suggest ways and means to
remedy these problems.  3/
68.  Enterprise Valuation for Divestiture: As divestiture intensifies,
one central question that governments have to address is  how much to sell an
enterprise as an on-going concern for. If a government decides to merely sell
the enterprise's assets, thus carrying the responsibility for liabilities, tne
question is how much it should charge for these assets. If a government opts
to sell part of an enterprise's equity in capital markets, the question is how
much the share is worth. On all these questions, the Bank has not yet
developed a recommended methodology. Rather, the exercise has largelv been
left to investment  bankers, accounting firms or bureaucrats. As a result,
enterprise valuation has been determined on the basis of a variety of
methodologies; for example: the price:earnings ratio, negotiation, the highest
bid, the replacement cost of capital, or the discounted stream of future costs
and benefits.
69.  While each methodology has it own merits, it  is not clear whether
applied methodologies correspond to developing country conditions or reflect
the well-being of society; especially in situations where capital markets are
33/  In a recent paper, Lacey (1990) analyses the  different elements of the
PE budgetary burden. He argues that needed macroeconomic reforms are likely to
affect the finances of PEs negatively in the short-term and that substantial
expenditure may well be required to enable PEs to survive in  a more competitive
environment, thus adding one more reason to support the need to explore the
budgetary impact of PEs.--. 4-
underdeveloped and relative prices are distorted. To  assist its borrower
countries in this regard, the Bank will need to develop and d.isseminate  an
operational approach ta  div.estit..re  decisorns, %which  should t  nen be rout ne';
applied in a manner similar to the wav  cost/benefit analvsis is new being
applied to project evaluation.34/
D.  Learning From Experience
70.  As ..ted, empirical evidence regarding the impact of attempted
reforms on the performance of PE is relacively scarce. Similarly the
effectiveness of some of the reform components remains largely un-analyzed. At
this stage, sufficient time has elapsed to permit a systematic assessment of
the experience to date. The most important aspects deserving further
invescigation include: the outcome of PE reforms, the ex-post performance of
divested firms, the efficiency ccnsequences of involuntary resettlement of
labor, and the effectiveness of program contracts on the performance of PEs at
the micro level. This sub-section elaborates on these issues.
71.  Outcome of PE Reforms: With a few exceptions, most Bank
assessments of PE reform either address the degree of compliance with
conditionality, the effectiveness of the instruments used, o. the problems
encountered in implementation. Rarely has the effect of PE reform been
assessed in terms of outcomes; e.g. profitability, productivity, exports.
budgetary impact, crowding out the private sector etc.
72.  As noted, it may not have been possible in the past to measure the
effect of PE reforms in terms of outcomes, in principle because of the brief
period during which PE reforms have been attempted on a sectoral basis. It now
appears, however, that sufficient time  has elapsed, at least in a few cases,
to permit such a study. The objectives would be to detail the outcome of
attempted reforms, and provide insights a.dd  feedback from experience to
improve future attempts at reforming PEs. Notably, a study of the nature
described here is underway for three Latin American countries; Chile,
Argentina and Mexico. It  would be desirable to mount similar regional studies
in the rest of the Bank.
73.  Ex-Post Performance of Divested PEs: Divestiture as a device for
improvIng the contribution of PEs to a country's economic development has
increasingly been used by developing and developed countries. It has been
supported by the Bank in 35 countries in over 70 PE reform operations.
74.  The intensified use of divestiture rests on two empirically
verifiable propositions; first, it  will improve  productive efficiency and,
second, it  will reduce the  budgetary burden of PEs. there has been no
systematic empirical verification of these propositions, especially drawing
upon the experience of LDCs, nor has there been an attempt to produce an
34/ A theoretical  welfare-based approach to divestiture decisions has been
developed  by  Jones et.  al. (Forthcoming).  Further  work may  be necessary,  however,
to  make  the  approach  more  operational  and  adaptable  to  various  modes  of
divestiture and varving country circumstances.-25-
empirically-based set of stylized facts abouz the co-ditions under which
divestiture will or will-  not work.
,5.  To address  .Lhese  questions, the Bank has launched a research
project which is expected to be completed by Jur.e  1991. Cn the basis of a
sample of divestiture experience in 4 countries, the project is intended to:
(1) quantif% -he effects of the change in ownership on economic efficiency and
the budget, (2) attempt to attribute the outcome of divestiture to its causal
factors, and (3)  on the basis of the findings,  make recommendations regarding
future divestiture programs.
76.  Involuntarv Resettlement of Labor in PEs: It has long been
observed that the performance of PEs is adversely affected by redundant
workers. Therefore, attempts to reform PEs have often included measures to
reduce the labor force. To alleviate the adverse effects on workers resulting
from lay-offs,  programs to reduce the labor force in PEs have often been
accompanied by training, redeployment and severance payments.
77.  Despite these attempts, it is not clear how redundant workers have
been identified in the past, what has been the impact on the enterprises in
which these reforms were undertaken, and what safeguards were introduced to
ensure that the enterprise's remaining  work force possesses the appropriace
skill mix. Put differently, while the approach to  workers' redundancy has been
appropriately welfare based, the approach's efficiency consequences have not
been sufficiently analyzed. To address these questions, it would be desirable
to analyze a few case studies in which workers resettlement  has taken place,
with a view to making recommendations to ensure that staff reductions are
implemented in the future in a manner that is consistent with efficiency
considerations.
78.  Micro-Level Assessment of Program  Contracts: It is obvious that
not all PEs  will be divested. For these, a mechanism of one sort or another
will have to be put in place to ensure the accountabilitv of their managers to
the government as the owner. Program contracts have been used, especially in
Africa, but increasingly in India, the Maghreb, and some Latin American
countries, as well as an instrument to clarify enterprise objectives, to
ensure managerial autonomy and accountability, and ultimately to improve the
performance of PEs. To  date, we do know that  performance has not improved or
that  when it has it cannot be rigorously traced to the execution of program
contracts, especially at the micro level of investigation.35/  Given the
uncertainties surrounding their outcomes (due tO the  JLubiem  if  information
asymmetry), and their continued intensive  application, it is important to
analyze their effect on enterprise efficiency and managerial motivation on a
sample basis, with a view to determining their impact  and drawing lessons for
future application of this instrument.
35/  Programs contracts have recently been assessed at the aggregate level
in developed (e.g. France) and developing countries (e.g. Senegal and Morocco)
(Nellis, 1.988).-26-
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
79.  As noted, mans governments around the world are reexamining the
role of the st.ate.  Questions of divesting PEs and attempts to improve the
efficiency of those that will remain public are likely to intensifv, rather
than diminish, in che near future. In the process, the Bank will increasingly
be called unon for advice and financial support in managing the transition
period.
80.  To meet che anticipated demand, three  main observations are noted.
First, the Bank's focus on the rationalization of the size of PEs, through the
liquidation of non-viable PEs and the transfer of ownership and/or control to
the private sector when such actions are expected  to promote efficiency,
should continue. In assisting its borrower countries to improve the efficiency
of PEs remaining public, the Bank should continue to emphasize the PE policy
framework as well as their institutional set-up. Countries which tried one
without the othAr have, as already noted, achieved only modest gains, if any,
in the performance of their FEs.
81.  To increase the effectiveness of Bank supported PE reforms, the
second observation concerns the need to extend the analytical approach, refine
reform components and tools, and learn from experience. To reiterate from
section IV, further work is necessary to:
I.  Extend the PE analytical approach to:
* Socialist economies,
*  The relationship between PEs and the private sector, and
- The issue of phasing and sequencing of PE reforms.
2.  Refine PE reform components and tools. especially regardinz:
- The phasing and sequencing of price liberalization and
competition,
- The budgetary impact of PEs, and
- The valuation of enterprises for divestiture.
3.  Learn more svstematically  from experience by analyzing:
- The outcomes of PE reforms and their causal factors,
- The ex-2ost performance of divested PEs and its
determinants,
- The efficiency consequences of staff reduction, and
- The effectiveness of program contracts on enterprise
efficiency at the micro level.
82.  The list of proposed topics is not exhaustive, but is still
extensive, Therefore, it should be viewed as a medium-term agenda. It too
requires some phasing and sequencing. Hore  importantly,  it  requires, within
the Bank, concerted effort and collaboration between PRE and the four regions.
PRE is  well positioned to provide inter-regional  perspectives. Technical.  and
Country Departments can provide regional patterns, country-specific
experiences, and operational direction for the needed research. Additional
insights can be gained from collaborating with the academic community and
other institutions concerned with the same issues.-27-
83..  The third, and final observation concerns: (1) the lending
instrument, (2) the duration of PE loans, and (3) the quality of  project
design. Regarding the lending instrument, it has been noted thac most  attemp::s
to reform PEs have used SALs as their vehicle, rather than PELs. No doubc the
choice of inscrument should be considered on a case by case basis. Yet, as FE
problems are complex, and as SALs generally  have to be selective and macro-
oriented, it may be desirable to use PEL operations more frequently than has
been true in the past.3/ Concerning the duration of PE lending operations, it
has also been noced that several components of PE reforms take longer to
implement (e.g. divestiture, institutional reforms) than permitted under a
typical SAL disbursing period (approximately 12-18 months). Moreover, PE loans
often involve TA components and finance  both imports and investment.
Therefore, it  may be more appropriate to extend the disbursement period of PE
reform loans  beyond the average time for SALs, say to 3-4 years. Finally, two
recommendations can be made to improve the quality of project design. First,
PE sector reviews should, to the extent possible, precede mounting the lending
operation. In such reviews, the aim would be to identify the root causes of
the PE problems and to recommend appropriate solutions. Second, in order to
bring inter-regional perspective into PEL operations, it may be desirable to
devise a procedure involving PRE at an early stage of project design. (Prior
to the reorganization, a lead advisor mechanism was in  place).
3/  The  assumption  here,  which  has  yet  to  be  verified,  is  that  PEL
operations will permit, better than SALs, adequate focus on PE issues, which
should in turn  increase the effectiveness of PE reform programs. This also
assumes that macro reforms under a SAL precede the PEL.-28-
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Jmica  I  6.l  1.6  26
ad"aascar  5.7  1.4,  25
Braii  29.0  6.4  22
Peru  10.2  2.2  22
Nala"u II  1.5  0.3  20
("a  5.0  0.8  16
Coro  I  11.0  1.?  15
Cot.  d'1vaire  16.0  2.4  1s
Pakistan ,,  7.0  1.0  14
Argwtina  l8.5  2.5  14
Guirienalssau  6.0  0.J  13
Cam  werde  4.7  0.6  13
Togo  U1  3.5  0.4  11
Jmica  11  9.0  1.0  11
Guinea  9.5  1.0  11
CAit 1  8.0  0.8  10
N4aJritaia  Ii  *.6  0.4  9
Cro  I I  *.0  0.3  8
Pakistn  1  7.0  0.5  7
Iwanda  4.8  0.3  6
Costs  Rica  3.5  0.2  6
Avers"  7.8  2.9  37
at*:  Aproved  a  of  Juai 19WTA.te  :  PtIICPAIL  Ct6qWYS  3F  Pt1N  C6  P1OW.CTS
A.  CltitA^E  OMCIII
Crovt  td  Goce,rint/pt
PPiCst  I  lq  I rmetint  411ta  i  titure
Swin  (P1L)  kAtiA  (PI1)  Carog  (P11.)  Coea  (P1L)  h  ,m (PtL)
Ca  Vwe  (TAL)  CWS  (PtL)  Glo  (PCL)  h  ((P1L)  Crs  (P)
Cgo(st1)  NeL  (P111)  J  Pic1  J)  fP(  L)  Gh1  (L)
Cav  (PItL)4  if  (PIL)  114,i  (OIL)  notI  (PtL)  J_icS
Cho  (PIL)  OfgW  (Pt  SICAL)  Mezco  (PtL)  Muintamie  (P61L)  Neli  (P1L)
jiic  (P111.)  iW  (P1t TAL)  (stud)  1toccgo  (Pil)  Mexios  Mt.)
me_mc.  MiiiZinw  (PtL)  Niger  (PtSECAL)  MtgW  (JOEL)  WI"g  (Pt  SICAL)
(reolie)  swmn  P9lmm  1inesi  (P6t.)  TImimism  (P11L)  li"g  (Pt  TAL)
Molt  MtL)  Tuisia  (PMt.)  Sor"el  Pt9mom i.es  (Ptl.)
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Comtract  Reviewi
liqrovifq  imforwtmon  wNtluwI  pla'  aV  riiev  on
controt  OI0  etlc  Ud  Uwltotirg  t(eso  Olniae?  Soard  of  inn  Iat
eficl"  surves  sYstm  tr6im1r;  areants  directors  l  oin ert
Argtile  Argntine  lSonm  (P1L)  Argwmtlne  Swim  (111.)  Argentina  Argentina
lWin  (P1L)  CAl  11ait  gralt  lurwii  Nei  (PiL)  C_ronr  I
111rit  Carno  (011.)  BfurIo  Suurldl  roci  I  NO1oc  o  (PIL  Ca  Verde  (AL)
|4j\##f  CWGame  I I  Coaro  Di  Ot  Cam  Verde  (TAL)  Chad
ChitS  Gaiwe.-sissaa  Congo  (iPl.)  Gah  (111.)  Comip  Comgo  (P1L)
Cogo  (PIL)  N4eil  icmuner  Ncegacar  C  GImw  (Mt.)  Ecuaor
Guieal-isseu  I  Mexico  (PIL)  Gbons  (P1L)  loiI  Gh one  I  G%  (PEL)
JIC0  MoroCco  (Pl.)  Jiac  Nsei  (P1L)  Coto  4dvoire  Cuimea-sssai
Meli  019r  (P11.)  J1ca  (P11)  aMi  (Pt  SECAL)  mICa
Plot  (I1t.)  Nl  "oti  (P1L)  NIgor  (P1.)  Matl  (Pt  ?AL)  . ics  (PEL)
*5xic0  (PtL)  Peru  Mesice  (PL)  Seneglt  IIItnmis  MP1L)  .1
MoCco  (Mt.)  Tw.isa  (Mt.)  MOcco  (PMt.)  sawei  I I  Marltnwh  11  'ati  (Pt  SECAL
Wi  r  (PtL)  WieW  (111.)  Meulco  (P1L)  Nati  (Pt  'AL)
Pakistan  Peistam  (study)  Nl.dm'taniel  (Pt
peisltu!  It  PeAletum  11  Morocco  (P.)  *ex  CO  (PIL)
Peru  P  Niger  (Pt S1CAL)  '9.r  (Pt  StCA
P9iti(mimes  (P6L)  Ptu  loiger  (Pt rAL)  Nif*r  (Pt  7AL)
senega  Senegta  Swga  t  II  Paitincta
S4eeg  II  Serg  1  Tog  II  pfitinilmet  (P
Suaw  Sudsm  TrjmllrlsT  (P6.)  S5dm
Tog"  11  o  III  7rI,,1  (PIEL)
runtsla
Not:  Sectim  A.  of  the  tegle  rmc(6Kb  tecfmlnc&i  smi;tw%ce  louw  (TAS  rI  "tic
entefpiio  ton  &Waved  as  of  Jia  19".  It  exciOte,  %L&  Lrd  SICALS.-36-
Tabto  5:  PSIWCIPAL  COiOMNTS  OF  Of  S  IFt  IN STUUTUIAL  ADJUSTWEMT  LgEDING
A.  POLICY!ILATED  REFORMS
Ser-u  i 01 
expmditures  ww
torrawirms;  ircresse
Incrsase/  interest  cAerges;
Li braU  l  Libetralize  reis  Z  utetic
prices/tarif4s  trad  ects  to  credit
lrnim  lenim  tnim
lfiviS  *  .61  I  sOivia
uruntdi  I  Ca_roon  IJrurf.t  1I
Buruani  II  CAR  I  (st
(study)  Cogo  CAR  I
Cinrooti  Costs  tica  I  CAl  I1
CAR  Coat  d'lIvoir  11  Chils  III
CAh 11  (stUdy)  Coto  d'lvoirs  III  Comgo
Congo  Gha_a It  Costa  Rica  iI
Costs  tic  I  Guinio  I  Cote  d'I'tirs  I
Costa  Rica I  Guirwe  11  Cot*  d'lVoir*  III
Coat  d'lIoair  11  Guimnoolisaau  I  Ga
Cats  d'Ivoirs  III  GuirwaSliscau  It  Gia  I
G0aiO  J_iico  I  G&i  a  11
Guimns  I  J,ica  II  Gh_w  I
G*uinea*Bissau  I  Jimica  III  Guinsa  I
Guiinsa*lissau  11  Kt  a I  Guinsa  11
J_iica  I  Korea  GOuims-Sissau
m_ics  It  Lao  I  tore  II
Ji_ica  [II  Mataui  III  Nig2er
Korts  11  Maw  i t iu  Pgn  I
watawi  I  Iftei  I  SenlaL  I I
Malawi  It  Ne  II  Teog  III
N"se  Nigsr  ti.isia
Ijig*r  Swmmmim  I  Turkey  I
Psnm  I  Swm  I I  Turkey  II
Swim  It  Sao  ?r  &  Principe  Tutry  [it
Sea rTe  & Principe  SW"" a  I I  Turkey  IV
SensaL  lII  thPia,ld  I  VnzueLi  I
Thoitand  I  ThaiLan  It
Thaitland  11  rogo  III
Turkey  I  Turkey  V







Wats: Appoived  as  of  juj  I' ot 5 5  cCord)
S.  O  UWIWNNT/PI  3ILATIO  S
inforticn  I  ot  _netaion
Eqlo'  I_t  MNiagrt  unW  Imra4  af
Und  saLary  and  f lns  *  s  tI  SWt  tafc  to  psrtlj
patStices  "Aits  syste  soim  recovr  pte  Liquidation  01OWveTi.
Winn  CAM It  sva4  1  ,ndiI  I  g  11  *l  U  sai  surun,  I
*uria~I  I1  Cate  d'Ltvir  I  suitmI 11  CAR  1i  C  _o  rn  Ssrurdi  I  CAR  I
:_rocm  CotC d'liro  III CAR  I  CJ i's  CAR  I  Surv'.  It  CAR  1
CAR  I  C~  Cus U  Can"  CAR  II  C_roon  Ch1ur
CAR  1I  G.hW  I  Cate d'lvsir  II  Cots dIvire  tl  C)is III  CAM  I  Or
Cc40  Gha  11  orqn,ca  O,nice  Congo  CAR II  Cost:4  Rica
Cots d'!voire  I  Gsjirwe  11  C  G  Cote d'lvoir.  I  Congo  a;
On,aca  _inica  I  Gh  I  Gh  I  Cate  d'lvoire  1II  Costs Nice  I  .CMs  I
C&M  Jesse  111  Ghafi  11  (UII  Gh.m  11  O<tritcs  Gaaw  ooin  H1
Camirs I  555'Guinlea  LIre  ICi  Ai  - eso  I  lzol418i  Ci  1Guiirw  11  G~  Ghaf  I  l^h  sm 
G&ta  II  Maurltius It  tKowa  I  Guliwse-iswu  I  Warts  I  Guiwo  I  '?  i
Sh;i  1L  Migr  maLawi  I  Kse*s  tI  Cuiise  I  Guimes Ut  ;Wires  I
Guinea  I  swwa  III  me"  11  11  Malati  It  Gwoins  11  Gyi'ns*Sissau  11  GQ*o  11
Gme  It  To"a  I  5i5  Nritnit  G.tnesa-  isaw  I  i  r  Ja_it  I
Gimes5lSissaw  I  To"  I1  Pakistan  5i  W  G.a;riassta  11  n  I  &"Ica  It
J  Zc1  It  To"  Ill  snsgi  I  I L  Ssrgai I  IL  sdr  D,s_  I  l;v  I  a  I:
Mautitius  I  to"  I  S.aIt  111  Jmieca  I  Ser*ga IL  alaw  tHI
MOUjtig  I  TUg  111  T!`iLsM  11  Ji_ica  1L  Sw  Lt  %It 
05t  1  Tursy  IIL  logs  It  Jatcc  IIU  Togo  I  Nsoa  H 
519sf  Tirrty  V  Togo  III  Uslaiu  I  Too  IL  iger
srwgal  I  urusaoy  ITwrksy  II  10s  Togs  III  PSEWm"  I
tw  si a  Turkey  V  Pfilli  mime  I  ur'.*,y  II  pe  HVAt
Slrk1v  Uru  g  u  y  I  Sao  lows  1  Za'  roSaC  ill  &
fTjrkq  LI  VL  Pltps  Pr*  cipe
Turtke  IV  Senal  II  SM  at  ;;
JgyLo  I  'oLo  It
Utguay  L  I  TOga II
veftsuato  Togo  III
(review)  T'jrkey  i
Zai  re
o0te:  AXroV*d as of  .1w  1969-38-
T*O  6: CTENTI  ,  L0CATION  AM VALLS  Of Pt  FrEC  IN &ALS
L  OUn
At
Coumtry  Reforu  Neaoures  (USS!)
enin  Ooienaetic  stt.iols  Liquiidtion,  oV privatizatlon  4.5.0
of  sloected  SOs;  civiL  service  rejctio  progrm:
fi'nM  ial sectoF  re  sructuring,  ineludin  Liquidation;
new Low  definirn  governnt/PI  relationship.
Sotivia  Incrreso  tariffs  w'  prices;  eonitor  50.0
*xpendituue  and  borrowings  of  eijor  Ofo.
bururdl  I  Liquid  stion;  rehabilltation;  create  metion1  15.0
servico  in  chnrr of Pts;  proe  re dlegiois  16.2
of private  sector;  preaor stratey plum  for
Pig;  devetop  infor_tion  system;  implement
sectorol  policies  including  price  liberwlization,
incroese  dOcmntratization.  Create  Interver  ion  fund.
5ururdi  II  Adostion  of  Pt  decreo  on Legai  frtorkot:;  Liquidate  90,0
*  PCs;  sign  perforrnco contracts;  refabilitation
progrom  for  '  Ms;  hotes:  studles  on price/tarilfs,
incentive  systm,  privatization,  finwnciat  flows  bet0wn
State/Pt:  implement  HIS;  strenqthen  IMIPL.Al;  strenqthen
civil  sorvice;  strwsnthen  Ministry  of  Laer.
Cairoon  Signature  of  perfor  nce  contracts  for  key  SOts;  150.0
action  ptan  for Liquidation  aid  restructuring  of  key
banks;  Legal  reforms  of  ".oi Ode  in encee  to  poruit
restructuring.
Central  African  Olvestiture/restructuring  nd rhab.  action  1t.0
Rep.olic  I  plans;  ekinate  arroars  wd  restoro  finweial  16.0
discipline;  iwove  Pof  fficienc'v;  ceiling  on
persorrie  growth;  strengthen  Goverrmont'r
manitaring  ability.
Central  African  Perforeneo  anaysis of Meior  PCs;  Pt audits;
eesiclic  11  freze on  rnw  Pts;  r-ue  staffing;  settle  cross
debt;  ctarify  responsibitity  for  prearDing  3year PIP:
tariff  policy;  action  ptan  for  institution  legal
franwork  studr;  starard  iroce  duro  for  privatization;
continue  privatization  for  agreed  Pis; Liquidate;
rehabiLitate  3  PIs;  train  civil  sorvnts; transfer
redundant  civil  soervants  and  freeze  staffing  Otane;
reinforce a  g  bilL;  reorganize inistries  of Itzn.
Caires,  lrdu  try,  uraol  de.velopnt and SW
ChMIL  Coordination  of  SOd invsotment  pnoe  and  250.0
m  croeconomic  policies;  stuc.y  on SOI  m  aog~nt.
Chile  II  Cantirse  divestituro  prograo.  250.0
Chile  [i  laenking  sector  study.  250.0
Conro  01vetiture;  finncial restructuring  nd  70.0
discipline;  banking  sector  reforms;  staff
reduction  amd  personnl emn  ijnt; aopt
legislation  for  _imngint  contracts,  rw
procurnt  proeciroo.  refine Pt  statut",
Govt.  rolation  ad  versight  structures.
Rehabilitation  measures  for  selected  Pts.-39-
TabLe  6:  CCITtMT,  LrATIO  AM  VALL  F0 Pt  REtFM  !N  SALS
Amun
Co.untrY  *efo.-m  Zasur  (uS5m
Costa  mica I  cr1etioin  of  action  plan on dlvotiture  of  S0.0
CISA  otfolio.  Prep.  of  actifn  program
to  improve  tlie  mi.ginn  and  _rketing  of
UETICA  wnd  strwrqth4n  ept.  of  CATSA  under
TAL;  emloets  proqri_ of  reorognization  wod
policy  impto'v~ts  4ate  TAL,
Tariff  Levis  to  be  ediuwtd  periodicatLy
to  a  Love(  sufficiant  to  cover  oerational
expwidture.,  oet  service,  w.  resonabLe
sJ9ar  of  investm,qt.
Costa  mica  It  Reduce  (evevs  of  aerears to  SO0  borks;  timit  100.0
subsidized  credit  to  SCI b*nks;  end qoverm'ant
menopoLy  on  ieprts.
Coto  d'tvoire  I  Institute  firanioL  controls  nd Limit  external  150.0
berrowinga;  reatlign salaries:  divest  shares in  SOBs;
audts  of  selected  Sa.;  ie_lnt  enterprise
action  p15w.
Coto dlIvoire  It  Price  Liberalization;  inprovo  informtio  W  250.7
mitoring  system;  iatioa%tile  governimnt/SO  retations,
includir  Le"at fr_mwork,  recovery  pim,  progr_
contracts,  wn tuteage  sytm;  ieprove MonegmenWt
restructure  agricuLturai  SOBs.
Cote d'ivoire  III  Targets for  reducirg  trnfers  from goverrvnt  to  250.0
private  enterprise  sector;  restrueturifig  ptans  for  5 PEs;
extend system of  contract  program  to  /  PIs;  iprove
accowting  system,  reinforce  systm of  rTable.  Oa  bords"
for  31  key  SOBs;  decontratize  procureet  procdures.
D0tirica  INDimontmtlon of  aClrooriato p"tlc  Sector to  3.0
wage  poLicy;  organization  to  increase productivity,
estmn  program  to  merge  mavower  requirsrnts;  IOC,
Tourist  Boord;  strtenthen  PSIP; strotegy  for  ipgrading
agricuLturat  extenston  service.
Guoon  Sui.ission  of  budgets  to  Ministries  of  PtLaning,  50.0
Ecorno;  Air  Gabon  progr_  contract;  stuc.y of
poratlic sector;  Li  quidation/iri4stization  of  9  PEs;
studii  of  31  PIs;  r"tructurirg  for  partpa,iic  sector;
staff  freeze;  reootiati  One  on  contracts;  satary  reouction
in  parmp.*Lic and civil  service.
Cameia I  Oivstiture  wad ratio  taization  ptan,  ecovatic  5.0
fessibiLity  stuoiie,  and  actions  to  secure  majority
private  equity  participetion  in  venture;  perforance
contracts with  3 SOs.  Tariff  increaso.
GCio  If  Satisfactory  progress  in  perfor_me  reviel,  with  23.0
retrcturinmg  to  "aimwe officiemcy;  ieprtimtotion  of
Pt divstiture  progrm;  restructure  Ministry  of
AgricuLture,  privtitmnrg  its  comrcia  activities;
signature  of  perfor_we  contracts  on selected SOBs.Tgeze &:  :-I?tTI,  .OCATION AN  ALI.M OF Pt  IPFCW IN  SAL$
*sjfli**  *.forU  "eeuret  (JS>)
Gh0iai I  NtiorZtization  plm  of  CO0CO0  prepwre lget,  34.0
retrecrl  plntation  corters,  divest  52 plantation;
freeze  on ner Sols; action  plon  for  pcleingq  aut.on;
i  ntmify  SOs to  t  incorporated:  divestiture  pton  for
30 SOls; esteaois ruw State  Emterprise Crmission;
cororate  pkwr  for  14  SCEs;  idetify  arrears  and cross
dects  for  14  $01l;  ratiouzie  civit  service  saLaries;
deveiov stiLl  mecilitaticin  scfi;  arove  1987
recrrcts?it  progrm;  esteetish Project  MI  tgnt  unit;
high  LeveL  SAL  te--.
Sh  ar% I  oUatiung  of  perforwowce contracts  on 14  priority  Soft;  120.0
ivptmntation  of  1989 SO divestiture  progrn:  action
plon  for  1990  SO  divestitures.
0.su!i4U  C  Preopre  and  aprove  divestiture  strategy and action  25.0
cian  for  irmusiriaL  SOs;  liquidate  19 irdatriat  ari
'  rno  irmoustriaL SOEs  aid E;CC';  egree  501 wOrkin
capitaL,  credit,  aid  foreign  exctiange  provisions;  suspen
Air  Guimrea's irteratioron  l  services;  review  statutes  of
"tiAc  utiLities;  revise  automv  prowvsions  im  part,
airport  aId  rait  vy  statutes;  revise  suitin  sector  Le"at
and taxatiom  arranogeints;  revise  Air  Guineaos statute;
review  aid  r0oMnce  ircentives  for  private  sector  1oo
:eration;  rove  Ct0  e  utioy'  s  from  civit  service  roals.
OUI_Oe  It  i.iqui  ation  decree;  privatize  agreed  $01s;  coatission
to  reco,srid  privetization;  restructure  SOs  in  hotels
tarasoort;  iuporve  Le"at,  imstitutiomta  framewort;  revise
clvii  service statute.
Zuuo eaissau  I  Coimpresiensive  diagniosis  of  PE  sector;  rece  resL  gage  0  0
till  through  rtauciru  civiL  service;  stren'gtnn EACS
(etectricity  firm)  increase  tariff;  aootish  state
lenocioLy  on  crop  purchases  refors  parastataL  tradinq
iirm ;  transfer perastateL  retain  outtets  to  private
sector;  encourage  exorsion  of  private  sector  tructxiN;
strengtMen  idationat  aric  caasaiLities.
Gw.,teeS'ssau  1  Oivest,  refstructure  molor PCs:  etiminate cross  detts;  23.4
onese  out  transfers;  ircroaxe  Legislative  improvemients
to  PIE ,wuagiit;  ereation  of  ministry  of  Ecornmic
Coordimation  to  monitor  PE  reform;  specific  action
Pt  n  for  etLctricitY  PE,  inc l ud ing Rwneg  t  and
fiwnotcio  iiuprove  t  ts.
oonciuras  Cotprensive  review  of  "tLic  experditures;  red.uce  50.0
conotidated  puctic  sector  deficits;  action  ptan  for
livestiture  progrm  for  irnLatriaL  ard forestry  SOEs;
action  pian  for strernining  and institutionat  c"Wags
of  mojor PEs;  irstitutionaL  and  fiancitL  restructuring
of  etectricity  SCE.
JufeICX  IIncreseo  prices;  divest  irwrofitable  SOls;  wuaqnt  76.2
&dWits  of  seLected  Sols;  inpinnt  enterprise  action
P Lani.
.aiuuaca  li  Increase  prices;  epie(nt  enterprise  actin  plans;  60.2
privetize selected SOs;  reduce  staffing; Limits on
new  50s5.rook*  I  'IT1WT, LOCAT!a  AIw  vALj  O  Pt  *eFr13  IN  SALS
.aJ9try  RefOrm  tesures  (USS.)
saqUic  III  Increase  prices  an  tariffs;  iNt  ~t  action  progr  55.0
for  six  SC0S;  qWM1n  t  aits  of  selected  51s; review
cn  revise  financiat  targets;  divest  nrofitablo  SCEs.
of  finnwciel  targets;  divestntt  of
Kanys  I  :Mrova  oitor,rq  system;  issue  guidelirns  on  grouti  55.0
of  S01  sector.
Keya  Ii  [Iwove  procedures for  eveluating  SC1s for  treasury  130.9
invot9nts.
Korea  li  Improv*  ".ttic  sector  officiency,  imageriel  autarncy  300.0
in  buoeting,  persarr(  ard  perocurent;  devetop
perforice  evwa  t'on  systeb;  tranter  sm  S01s to
private  sector;  oeiminmate  5s"idized  creoit  to  S01s;
increase  prices.
LAo  Contimue  policy  ot  not  sueoidizirq  5U  bu0qets;  identify  40.0
SICs  to  be  restructured  and reloati  tated;  incress  SCe5
aut ony.
NxaLwi  I  Incresse  prices  and tariffs;  mangement  audits  of  45.0
selected  lSOs;  iklnt  enterorise  &ction  otans;
Ii.ujdato  saOt  SOEs; iiYRQfV  inoMirftt1/ir1nitaOring
systm.
NaLawi il  lopteet  studies  for  operetiomat  ard  finewciat  55.0
improv~t  of  WCEs; wroak review of  firurial
accowuts;  increse  tariffs  and  us*r  cMarges.
Malawvi  III  taritf  increases;  irwov  eftfctivewss  of  0OS in  30.0
stnitoring  financial  oewrtions;  actionp oan  to  remve  40.0
PC deficits;  asset  rationslization;  mwnitor  M0C's
pertorwlne;  wdiux  mterm  corporate  plan  preared.
woaritarnia  Studv  ot  state  portfolio  And action  progre;  improve  15.M0
carrels  tor  >etic  coptitiv*  baiding  and  manrgeit  27.4
decision  processes.
MaUr  tics  I  PeepdoJy  persorwel  in  thre.  wujor  SoEs;  restructure  15.3
goals;  iiwove  officincy.
Marit us: )  Redooley  Dersorwel  in  three  mijr  Sots;  mwrqent  0.  0
audits  ot  selected  SOEs; imotlnt  new accowtirg  system.
Nepal  I  Action  plan  for  privatization  and/or  'iwngaeral  50.0
retori  ot  Pfs;  awards  e  pslities  for  winngors.
tool  It  Contirmution  ot  sector  strat,y  oat hending  over  60.0
mwna  t  ot  swL  and  mdiue  "tLic  irrigatior
projects  to  atirwrs;  study of  comercial  pwrobAle
wi  dewSoamit  of  stratey  for  reofbilitation  and/or
privati  zaion.
Miger  Persormwt  statute  tor  Pt$;  revise  perastatal  L  aor  Laws;
Legislation  to  adjust  ninistries;  reoebiatitato  2 PIs
fimet  decision  on  3 P1s;  reuc  predicts  subject  to  price
controls;  liminato  cross  dects;  decision  on  consoLioating
r"onsibiLities  ot  IGIELEC  wi  OFEDES;  cwopteo CNCA
&auit;  iNrove  debt  collection;  cost  recovefry  study;
eivil  service  study.Teibe  6:  C?  INY,  iOCATION  AM  VALIUE  OF Pt  lFO  :1i SALS
Coumtry  Reform leasures  (US!.)
PoiI Stan  lff0  nt  systm  for  gvetiating  S(  performencoe  140.0
provide  inceontive,  ireltuing  par"etata  Labor  awe;
inforwetion  base &,id performe  imdicators.
arg enterpris  p rforwenes  indicators.
Pan  S  oaeo  dm.tiec  cnt  price;  terminate  pricing  60.2
arrangemnt  atwewen  c_ment  cemiee;  I igidsto  ar
privatize  selected  Slse;  studV  cost  rection.
Pon_m 11  Closeo  ard  divest  Sos.  100.0
Phi L  ippines  Forf.jlate  indutriao  restructuring  progra  for  200.0
5 mjor  sectors.
sac  To  Now tariff  structure  for  e*ectricty,  water;  plan  to  4.0
& P.'nei'p  restructure  viable  P11; wuiform accoutinm  system.  3.0
S*M*al  I  Privatize  seleeted  SC0s; impint  progr_n-eontrscts;  60.0
staff  re*tion  plIn;  reform egriculture  sector  bv
reducing  State  intervention  (charge  in  credit,  finaciol
assiste:e  to  farmers).
Seiegalt II  Privetize/tiquidats  Pt$;  improve data.  orting;  20.0
clarify  gov*rmerit  sector  reoations;  recomcite  cross
arrears;firwiUze  contrect-plans;impro'v  controls  of  Sos.
Seea  ;I  Strengthen nien  t  anrl  institutioal  setting  45.0
for  Pt  sector;  Privetie/lliquidets;  ipl  nt  audit  4.00
restructuring;  redefine  role  of  WM; progr_  to
strenthen  intornal  paoning,  control  system,
finanoial  accourantil;  rdco  sn*5idiOs;  cotract-plans;
reconcit  arrears;  reform  servisiti  systm.
Thailand  I  Ircresse  tariffs.  150.0
rha  Itarid  II  rmcreas.  pricos;  efficiency,  _  _egnt  iprovmnts;  175.5
tiquidate  wprofitblke  SCIs.
Togo I  Pri 'tizt/liuiidats  selected  SOEs;  mnagmnt  su.it  40.0
selected  Sols;  iprove  progrming,  rw.ven.  monitoring
ard  eapenditures;  ariul  r"mrt  on SOl;  accoLsnting
syst  amr initiato  regwlar  audits.
Togo It  leprove  m1inagement.  gover_  rt/SWl  ""  ne"';  10.0
survey domtic  arrears  of  SOCt wd  restructure,
privatize  or  tiquidate  SO1s; wraal  reprt  on m 1or
Sole;  Afnts  sid  studies  of  SOCe.
Togo  1II  Seoranize  NIS-  revatuate  reguition  of  Pts;  45.0
supervis  SUL  progr_;  elaborate  MIS  for  SC s:  reassoss
privatization  stratey id  identify  priorities  for  1989-90;
privetize  setect  Psi  legal  ait of  16  Pts,  restruture
arrears;  debt  swai*int  egremnts;  contirma  adit  for  16
Pis  aiit  accownts for  OPAT  reoce  opwrtims  costs  ard
adept nme  structure;  revise  stoat  rolo  in  light  of  Stl
nemo;  ngotisto  mnorog t of  hotels;  rehabilitate  CFT;
saolish  mnopoly  on rice,  sugar,  tobacco;  reorganize  CEET
(nergy)  .
Tunisis  Control  real  woe growth in  public  sector  tisit  150.0
subsidies  ard restructure  economic  justification  for
wijor  "tic  sector  projects.--. 3-
T?Olt 6:  CMTIWT,  ,ATIU  AND VALLE  OF Pt RlFP  In SALS
L  oa
Country  Reform Meaures  (USt)
Pegistan  Implinnt  setm  for  ealuating  SIX  perfore,  140.0
provide  imncstive,  incLudirq  pereatatal  laor  Low;
inlorsetion  bae  and perforwome  indicators.
wa  nterprwise  pertorwce  indicators.
Pwn_  3gRce  dIntic  c_ment  price;  terimeto  pricing  60.2
arrnqmmnt  bete  ce_nt  cmiies;  Ltquidate  wW
privatile seeected Sls;  stOy  ceost  re.tiem.
Pmni  It  Clo"  an  divet  SOle.  100.0
P,l  iopires  PoruLate  indatriel  restructurin  proogr  for  200.0
5  "jor  sectors.
Sao Tm  New tariff  structure  for  ieectricty,  water;  pin  to  4.0
A  Principe  restructure  vioabe  Pte;  uaitfor  accounting  syset.  3.0
Senegal  I  Privatize seltcted  SCOS;  ip  _e  t  progr-wcontrcts;  60.0
staff  r.ction  pian;  reform  agriculture  sector  by
refb.-in  State  intervntiom  (chang  in  credit,  financial
assistwce  to  ftersr).
Senegal 11  Privit1/eiquidate  Pts;  ilprove data, reorting;  20.0
clarify  goverrnt  sector  rotatiorer  reconcile cross  44.0
arroers;finatize  contractplara;improve  cotrols  of  SOls.
Senegal  II  Strgthwoin  ainnt  and  in  titutiael  setting  45.0
for  Pt sector; Privatize/liquiidte;  ieplnt  suilt  40.0
restructuring;  redefine  role  of  GM;  progr_  to
strenthen  internal  plamimng  control  system
finmniaol  ccoueting;  reduce  ubsidies;  contract-olan;
reconcile  arrears;  reform  suprvislon  syt_.
Thailwad  I  Increao  tariffs.  150.0
Thailawd  11  Increase prices;  efficiency,  mwnag  t  improvennts;  175.5
Liq,uidate  .parofitable  SOEs.
Too  I  Privatize/liqulidato  selected  SCol; wAn'want  Ait  40.0
selected  Sols;  iprowe  progrtngir.  revsj  mnitoring
and exopditures;  aulal  report  on  SOCs;  accewting
systm  an  initiste  roglaer  audits.
Togo  it  lprove  mregt,  goverment/SU  retatiore;  10.0
survey  Istic  arreors of  Sos  and  restructure,
pwivati2e  or  tiquidete  Sols;  wreAa  report  on  major
Sol;  ailts  ard  studies  of  Sole.
Toge  III  Reorganite  "MI  . rewvotuate  reouiation  of  Pte;  45.0
pervls  SAL prograc;  *l(~at*  MIS  fow  SO;  reassess
privetilatlio  stratey  and ident1fy  priorities  for  1989-90;
priveatie  select  Pes  L  tga  wilt  of  1  Pigs.  restructure
arrows;  doet  swinirig  egree  ts;  cmt  irue  eilt  for  16
Pets  -sit  sccirnte  for  CPAT  re"9  operating  costs  and
adopt  new structure;  revis  state  role  in  light  of SCM
nmeed;  negotiate  _grenit  of  hotels; rehadtlitate  CFT;
aolish  sweopoly  on  rice,  sugar,  tobocco;  reorganize  CEET
(enery).
Tunisia  Control  re  wage  growth  in  "ti  c  sector - Limit  150.0
subsidles  ond restructure w  co.oic  justification  for
_jor  "tic  sector  projects.ToLo  6:  MtENT,  LOATIO  AND VALUI  OF Pt  RIF01  IN  SALS
.~t
*ountry  R~~~~~~eforim  seaurew  (uSS.)
uran  I  Eliminato  governut  Co trol  ed  prices,  uso  mrzta  200.0
forceS;  iprove  offici  sry  ard  prod.ctivity  of SW$.
Turkey  It  Liberalize  prices;  r"cs  oroin  on pAtiUc  fu';  r  eo  300.0
staffing;  improve  _re_nmrt  (selection  an  merit,
crttitivt  pay)  un  Stegtion  of  authority;  soctor
organization  changs;  poi  t icze go",  iz  nnt/5CE
riCiti*,  Manegement  s@tlction  VW  behovior.
'SI  Key  111  teform law  to  tiberatize  emloymnt  rrd  salary  304.5
pra-ctices;  laiit  hiring;  ipr  ove  inforiintioni
monitoring;  uti(ism  aited  accounts.
%urtey  IV  Set  pereters  for  ne"  leal  and  institutioast  300.8
frauwork,  with  focus  on  decentralization;  Liberatize
auplotmnt,  salaries;  timit  >lo"nt  growth;  attenti  on
to  accoint  l  ng  an  ai.riring.
Turtey  v  Review  of  selective  privatization  of  $c1  assets;  376.0
Liberatize  prices  and  impets;  imrove  monitorimg
system; persorUti  regime;  introco  moetrn  nmog.ment
technmiq,  pltaming  ard training.
Jrugvay  I  Maintain  rest  "tlic  enterprise  prices;  restructure  50.0
raltway,  water  cMMWies;  legisLation  to  associate
PLUMA  (airtines)  with  private  carriors;  action  to
strengthen  beDirig.
Uruguay  It  Privatization  of failed  b*s  ftollowing  their  140.0
rehOsilitation;  liquidtion;  periodic  irncreaoss in  PE
tarifts  in  stoo  With  inflation;  devoloO  Mnasgnt
Rrovemet progrm  aW perfonrice  irdicators  for
3 rilor  Pis.
ienetueia  EstaOsishmvnt  of intor,inisterial  crmission  to  review  402.0
and  approve  privatization  wrd  restructuring  proppsals;
classify  PEs as to  privetization  or  lisqidation;  trainimg
in  areas  of  privatization,  restructuring  PEs; studies  of
venezuelan  rinvestwnt  FPg's  role  in  face of  PE reform;
review of  institutiwatl  and  4lega frwork  goverming
PCs  so as to  improv  transperncy,  ar managent.
u'gostavia  Price  liberalization;  imrov firwncial  27 .0
accoialtaitity  of  enterprises.
7aire  Reass$s$  cOpital;  per  egislation;  externat  55.0
udtirig;  tiquidstioo  ov-trsight  structwro;  94.3
privetization;  stiAd  crossed  do ts;  restructure  Pfs;
system  for  aointing,  peyir  menegrs.racto  7:  UJxI  Of  ILAU POEC'TS WITM OIVISTITUDE COltPEMTS
C3ustry  SALS  SECALS  &/  *ALs  Ls  D/  -SrAL
AFPirCA
in  n  1  1  2
uwund  - 2  2
CArWoon  I  I
CAN  2  2
Conqo  I  1  2
G&eis  o2  2
GhWAi  2  2  1  5
Guinoe  2  1  3
Guine-gissau  2  2
Nadegscar  2  1  2
Naaw i  2  2
Nati  2  2
Mauritania  1  1
9igew  1  2  3
Sac rao  w  & Prin.  1  I
Sengat  2  2
Sudan  I
Togo  3  2  5
Zaire  1  1  2
Z'a  1  1
SUSTOTAL  26  6  5  6  45
LAC
.at  . i  I  I
'llsIt  tiesa  2 
qaitj  1  1
jmlca  3  1  1  5
Mexico
r  2  1  3
Jrtjguy  1  1  2
~eno2ueks 
SRL4TOTAL  1  1  1  4  i s
EWE  NA
,orocco  1
Trunst.  1  1  2
SLISTOTAL  1  1  0  2  4
ASIA
1mt  2  2
Pakista  Z  2
SUI-TOTAL  3  3  0  1  7
G^ANJ TOTAL  I1  11  9  13  74
'ote:  a.  Irctude  otLy  irnatry,  acomcic  recovery,  wd  export
relab,I  itation  SECALS.
O.  Includs  private  ent.rtbiss  rsa¶onalization  Lows,  pDl3c
enterprise  sector  adjusItnt  loam ,  dp  iuc  enterprise
instltutionai  d5vetLon0ft  projects.
Projects  approved  as of  ~kre  1969.-4-
Tab(* 3:  UME  PtOdECT  w1TW  OIVESTITURI CaEPdEmTS
C*umtrv  operation  Aawsaot
(USSM)
AIRICA
Bonin  Pt  I1ioab.  15.0
SAL 1  *5.0
Burundil  SAL I  15.0
SAL  11  9Is.0
C H8PanUSAL  I  150.0
Co  SAL  I  1'..0
SAL It  *0.0
Corgo  Pt  ID  15.2
SAL  70.0
Oaban  SAL  50.0
Cvo"i*  SAL I  5.0
SAL 11  23.0
Ghroa  Etaprt  PoOab.  40.1
Ind.  SECAL  28.5
PEL  10.5
SAL 1  34.O
SAL It  120.0
Guimle  SAL I  25.0
SAL II  65.0
TAL I  9.5
Guinea  lissau  SAL I  10.0
SAL I1  23.'
Madagascar  Ird.  and Trade  67.0
PS Adj.  125.0
MaLe.,  SAL 11  55.0
SAL III  30.0
Mati  Pt  10  9.5
Of  SICAL  40.0
mautitriua  Pt  !AL  16.'.
Miser  Pt  ID  5.5
Pt  SECAL  60.0
SAL  20.0
SaC Top*  £ Prinie  SAL  *  0
Sam"8.a  SAL II  20.0
SAL III  '5.0
Sudan  TAL  9.0
To"a  ,vt.  Ect.  11.5
SAL 1  *0.0
SAL It  27.8
SAL III  *5.0
TAL  III  6.2
Ugarua  Econ.  Mecovwry  65.0
Zaire  SAL  55.0
TAL  12.0
zambl  Ird.  ooarent.  20.0rab(.  8:  ANK PICfECTS  INT  oivtsYirT.*  CmEwT
Loan
Coutry  erata 
LAC
Chits  SAL  11  250.0
iAL  11.0
Costa  RiCo  SAL  I  80.0
SAL  11  100.0
i  riti  Ecor.  Rscow.ry  40.0
Nov3urea  SAL  I  50.0
.4IMO_c&  n  SECAL  20.0
SAL  1  76.2
SAL  11  60.2
SAL  lit  55.0
tAL  IL  9.0
MexIcO  PtIL  500.0
0aP  SAL  1  600.2
SAL  I1  100.0
TAL  5.0
Uruguay  SAL  I  140.0
TAL  11  6.5
Vomezuea  SAL  i  402.0
EMEPIA
Moroc °  PIlL  240.0
T m  sis  ASAL  11  84.0
PtIL  130.0
rurkey  SAL V  376.0
ASIA
LAo  SAL  I  40.0
mepak  SAL  I  50.0
SAL  It  60.0
Paig I sron  EAcort  0.v*(  oopmt  70.0
FirHIICiL  SECAL  t50.0
P14Ii  wirW,  Econ.  Recovery  300.0
Govwrvmit
Corporat  i os  200.0
'ite:  AWroV4s  As of  uM  19 PRE Workign Panar Series
Cor'.ac.
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